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INTRODUCTION 
A lawyer who represents a capital defendant with a strong 
innocence claim must allocate her resources between the separate 
guilt and penalty phases1 of the capital case. Expending resources in 
preparation for a penalty trial may result in less attention to securing 
the acquittal on the capital charge at the guilt trial that would make 
the penalty phase moot. But focusing primarily on proving the 
defendant's innocence at the guilt trial means less preparation in the 
case of a guilty verdict. Once a defendant is convicted of a capital 
offense, a lawyer must also make strategic decisions about the penalty 
phase. By focusing primarily on reasserting the defendant's claim of 
innocence, she can seek to convince the jury that they should spare the 
defendant because of their lingering doubt as to his guilt. Alternately, 
she can accept the jury's verdict at the guilt stage and focus primarily 
on introducing mitigating evidence that will explain the defendant's 
background to the jury. In dealing with these critical strategic choices, 
what should the lawyer do? 
In Wiggins v. Smith,2 the Court held a capital defendant's 
attorney's decision to focus solely on reasserting the defendant's claim 
of innocence at the penalty trial to be ineffective assistance of 
counsel.3 This decision demonstrated that capital defendants' 
attorneys' decisions to focus primarily or exclusively on reasserting 
defendants' claims of innocence at the penalty stages of capital trials 
will not automatically be viewed as reasonable strategic choices. As I 
will discuss below, the attorneys in Wiggins made some unusually 
1. Capital cases are bifurcated: first, the jury determines whether the defendant is guilty 
of any of the offenses with which he is charged; then, if the jury has found the defendant 
guilty of a capital offense, the jury decides whether the defendant will be sentenced to death 
or a lesser punishment. Although the precise issues to be determined at the penalty trial vary 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the penalty jury invariably makes its sentencing 
determination after considering aggravating factors introduced by the prosecution and 
mitigating evidence introduced by the defense. See generally Robert Weisberg, Deregulating 
Death, 1983 SUP. Cr. REV. 305, 306-07 (providing examples of capital-sentencing statutes). 
2. 539 U.S. 510 (2003) .  
3. Id. a t  535. 
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questionable decisions, making it difficult to determine how to apply 
the Court's holding to other fact patterns. To consider issues that arise 
more frequently, it is useful to consider Ronnie Chandler's trial for 
capital murder. Although Chandler's case is not necessarily typical, 
the problems presented for Chandler's attorney in that case exemplify 
some of the problems likely to be encountered by an attorney 
representing a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence. 
Near a small, rural lake in Piedmont, Alabama, Charles Jarrell 
killed his brother-in-law, Marty Shuler, on May 8, 1990.4 In 1991 the 
United States indicted David "Ronnie" Chandler for capital murder 
under the federal death-penalty statute, claiming that Chandler was a 
drug kingpin who had hired Jarrell to kill Shuler.5 Subsequently, 
Chandler retained Drew Redden, an able and experienced criminal­
defense attorney,6 to defend him at trial.7 Redden immediately began 
preparing Chandler's case.8 After interviewing "at least 67 witnesses" 
in the Piedmont area, Redden determined that the government's case 
against Chandler was weak.9 He "actively pursued acquittal"10 at trial 
and did not prepare for the penalty trial, which would only take place 
if Chandler was convicted of the capital-murder charge.11 
At trial, Jarrell, the government's chief witness, testified that 
Chandler had offered him $500 to kill Shuler, whom Chandler 
believed to be a police informant.1 2 Jarrell said that he accepted this 
offer, received a gun from Chandler, and drove Shuler to Snow's 
Lake, where the two engaged in target practice before Jarrell shot 
Shuler twice, killing him.13 Jarrell claimed that he then met Chandler 
and together they hauled "Shuler's body away for burial."14 
4. Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1310 ( 11th Cir. 2000). 
5. Id. 
6. At the time Chandler hired him, Redden had tried over 1000 cases. Id. at 1310 n.3. He 
was a former Assistant U.S. Attorney and President of the Alabama Bar, a member of the 
American College of Trial Lawyers and the International Society of Barristers, and listed in 
A merica's Best Lawyers "for his criminal defense work" and described as " 'an extremely 
talented defense counsel, probably the best in the state . . . .'" Id. (quoting prosecutor). 
7. Id. at 1310. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
1 1. See supra note 1 .  
12. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1310. 
13. Bill Rankin, Seeking Justice on Death Row; Inmate Fights for Life After Testimony Is 
Recanted in Federal Drug Kingpin Case, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 25, 1998, at Al4 
[hereinafter Seeking Justice]. 
14. Id. 
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Redden impeached Jarrell's testimony by showing he had made 
several "inconsistent statements. "15 When first arrested, Jarrell stated 
that he had not killed Shuler.16 Later he said that he accidentally shot 
Shuler,17 and then that he had murdered him out of "personal 
animosity."18 Finally, after receiving the government's promise that, in 
exchange for his testimony, neither he nor his son would be 
prosecuted for killing Shuler, 19 Jarrell implicated Chandler in the 
murder.20 
Redden also showed that Jarrell never received $500 from 
Chandler21 and had consumed twenty-three beers just before shooting 
Shuler.22 In addition, Redden presented evidence indicating Jarrell's 
motive for killing Shuler. Shuler had married Jarrell's sister and 
Redden introduced evidence showing that Jarrell was angry at Shuler 
because he had been an abusive husband.23 Jarrell even admitted that 
less than a year before he killed Shuler he had attempted to murder 
his brother-in-law because of the escalating abuse. At that time, after 
telling Shuler "he was going to kill him," he placed a "pistol against 
Shuler's nose and pulled the trigger," but the gun did not fire.24 At 
Chandler's trial, Jarrell told the jury that " ' [t]he Lord didn't intend 
for [Shuler] to die that night.' " 25 
Although the government's murder charge depended almost 
entirely on Jarrell's testimony, the jury convicted Chandler of capital 
murder, thus setting the stage for the penalty trial.26 The verdict 
shocked Redden.27 He had expected an acquittal and had done 
nothing "to prepare for the sentencing phase of the trial."28 In a last­
minute attempt to save his client's life, Redden asked "Chandler's 
wife . . .  to round up witnesses who could speak up for Chandler" at 
15. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1310. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 1311.  
19.  Rankin, supra note 13.  
20. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1311 .  
21 .  Id. at 1310. 
22. Rankin, Seeking Justice, supra note 13. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Bill Rankin, Pot Dealer May Be 1st Executed as 'Drug Kingpin,' ATLANTA J. & 
CONST., Jan. 23, 1994, at Gl [Hereinafter Rankin, Pot Dealer]. 
26. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1310. 
27. Rankin, Pot Dealer, supra note 25. 
28. Bill Rankin, Hard Times for Death Row Appeals?, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 31, 
2000, at lA. 
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the penalty trial, which was to begin the following day.29 Extremely 
distraught, she could identify only her preacher.30 . 
At sentencing, Redden's primary argument was that the jury 
should not impose the death sentence because of its lingering doubt as 
to Chandler's guilt. He also noted the defendant had no prior 
convictions and called his wife and mother to testify.31 In rebuttal, the 
prosecutor reminded the jury that even Charles Manson and " 'Jack 
the Ripper had a mother. ' "32 The jury unanimously recommended 
that Chandler "be sentenced to death. "33 
Chandler later sought to vacate his death sentence on the ground 
that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel at sentencing.34 
Specifically, he claimed that Redden's representation was 
unreasonable because he failed to "investigate and . . .  present 
character witnesses" at sentencing.35 Chandler's new attorney 
presented twenty-seven witnesses who testified to numerous occasions 
on which Chandler had assisted others in need of help. Martha Heath, 
for example, testified that Chandler bought her son two new pairs of 
shoes after seeing him running shoeless "around Piedmont's 
projects."36 Elaine Freeman testified that Chandler gave her 
neighbor's family money to pay for their son's burial when he died in 
an auto accident.37 Jerry Masters testified that Chandler helped erect a 
fellowship hall at [a] church and " 'didn't charge a penny.' "38 Others 
testified that Chandler built a porch so a disabled man could enter and 
exit his house, gave needy mothers bags of groceries, and donated 
heavily to charities.39 Chandler claimed that Redden's failure to do the 
investigation necessary to find these witnesses constituted deficient 
performance, thus satisfying the first prong of Strickland v. 
Washington's test for ineffective assistance of counsel.40 
29. See Rankin, Seeking Justice, supra note 13. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1312. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Rankin, Seeking Justice, supra note 13. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. For other mitigating evidence presented at the hearing, see Chandler, 218 F.3d at 
1312 n.8. 
40. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court held that in order to 
establish ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must show both that his attorney's 
representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," id. at 688, and that the 
defendant was "prejudiced" by his attorney's deficient performance, id. at 692. 
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The Eleventh Circuit, in a 6-to-5 decision, rejected Chandler's 
claim. The court concluded that "focusing on acquittal at trial and 
then on residual doubt at sentencing (instead of other forms of 
mitigation) can be reasonable . . .  [e]specially when . . .  the evidence of 
guilt [is] not overwhelming. "41 Because the government did not 
possess a strong case against Chandler, the court held that Redden 
acted reasonably.4 2 His decision to vigorously seek an acquittal at the 
expense of an investigation into mitigating evidence did not fall 
"outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance."43 The 
court thus affirmed Chandler's death sentence. 
After Chandler's death sentence was affirmed, Jarrell admitted 
that his testimony at Chandler's trial had been false.44 Nevertheless, 
Chandler's subsequent efforts to obtain relief from the courts have 
been unsuccessful.45 In 2001, however, President Clinton commuted 
his death sentence to a sentence of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole.46 
Chandler's case has attracted substantial media attention because 
of the doubts as to his guilt.47 Over the past decade, there have been a 
surprisingly large number of cases in which defendants sentenced to 
death have been exonerated.48 And stories like Chandler's may 
suggest that the cases in which defendants on death row have been 
41. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1320 (citation omitted). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 1327. 
44. Chandler Challenges Conviction, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Feb. 23, 2001, at SC. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. See, e.g. , American Justice: Marijuana and Murder (A&E television broadcast, Sept. 
19, 2001) (recounting the events leading to Chandler's conviction as well as the important 
events that followed - i.e., Jarrell's recantation, the Eleventh Circuit's affirmation of 
Chandler's death sentence, and former President Clinton's commutation of that sentence). 
48. Determining the number of defendants sentenced to death who were actually 
innocent in the sense that they had no involvement in the crime with which they were 
charged is, of course, difficult. Barring unusual circumstances, a court that reverses the 
conviction of a defendant sentenced to death does not even attempt to determine the 
defendant's actual guilt or innocence. Most often, a court will simply reverse the defendant's 
conviction, granting the government an opportunity to retry the defendant if it does so 
within a specified time. In a surprising number of cases, however, DNA or other evidence 
has provided seemingly conclusive proof that defendants sentenced to death were innocent 
of the capital offense for which they were convicted. See, e.g. , James S. Liebman, The New 
Death Penalty Debate: What's DNA Got to Do with It?, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 527, 
537 (2002) (observing that in November 1998, a conference held at Northwestern University 
"brought national press attention to the fact that as of then, seventy-five men and women 
whom American juries had sentenced to die . . .  had been exonerated as innocent"). Since 
1973, evidence of a defendant's innocence has freed 1 1 1  people from death row. Death 
Penalty Info. Ctr., Innocence and the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
article.php?did=412&scid=6 (current as of July 28, 2003). 
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exonerated through DNA-testing49 or other evidence of a wrongful 
conviction50 are only the tip of the iceberg. The Chandler case thus 
exemplifies a situation in which a possibly innocent defendant who is 
sentenced to death is unable to obtain relief from the courts. 
The Chandler case also illustrates the difficulties of appropriately 
allocating resources for attorneys representing capital defendants with 
strong innocence claims. Chandler's attorney's decision to focus 
primarily on obtaining a favorable verdict at the guilt trial is not 
49. Since 1973, twelve people have been exonerated and released from death row by 
DNA evidence. Keith A. Findley, Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice 
Commission to Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333, 337 (2002). 
50. When a defendant who claims she was wrongfully convicted seeks relief through the 
appellate process, she is likely to encounter formidable obstacles. See Lissa Griffin, The 
Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16 AM. U. lNT'L L. REV. 
1241, 1271 (2001). Appellate courts do not have the authority to hear new evidence, and 
most such courts cannot "reverse a conviction because they believe that the jury was wrong." 
Id. These courts can review an alleged wrongful conviction, but they must do so on the 
grounds that the trial court convicted the appellant on insufficient evidence. Id. When doing 
so, a court may examine only record evidence and must view that "evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution." Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) 
(internal quotation marks omitted}). It must then determine whether "any rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. 
(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Convicted defendants may also seek a "new trial based on newly discovered evidence." 
Id. at 1292. Such trials, however, are "rarely granted" due to "severe time limitations" and 
the need to "show a very high probability of success on the merits." Id. In federal courts, for 
example, Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a motion for a 
new trial "be made within three years of final judgment." Id. at 1292-93. The rule also 
requires a court to grant 
a new trial . . .  only where: 
(1) the [new] evidence .. . (has] been discovered since the trial; (2) the party seeking the 
new trial . . .  (has shown] diligence in the attempt to procure the newly discovered evidence; 
(3) the evidence relied on (is] not . . .  merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the evidence 
[is] . . .  material to the issues involved; and (5) (the evidence] [is] of such [a) nature that in a 
new trial it would probably produce an acquittal. 
Id. at 1293 (internal quotation marks omitted} (quoting Thompson v. United States, 188 F.2d 
652, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1951)). 
If these remedies fail, a defendant who claims she was wrongfully convicted has two 
other options: she may file a writ of habeas corpus in federal court or seek executive 
clemency. Habeas corpus provides only a slim chance of relief because the Supreme Court, 
in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), "drastically limited the right of a convicted 
defendant to invoke [it] based on a claim of actual innocence." Griffin, supra, at 1295. 
Moreover, even if a defendant would otherwise qualify for habeas relief she still has to 
surmount the new barriers imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA}, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-67 (2000}. See generally James S. Liebman, An "Effective 
Death Penalty"? A ED PA and Error Detection in Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 411 ,  415-
18 (2001) (discussing the obstacles posed by AEDPA for wrongfully convicted capital 
defendants). 
Finally, even when a defendant can show that it is likely she was wrongfully convicted, 
obtaining executive clemency is generally difficult. In most jurisdictions, the clemency power 
is "entirely discretionary" and subject to the "political process." Griffin, supra, at 1299. As 
there is no constituency "favoring the release of convicted criminals,'' id., executive 
clemency is unlikely to be granted unless the defendant can make a compelling showing that 
she was wrongfully convicted. 
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unusual, especially for criminal-defense attorneys with limited 
experience in representing capital defendants.51 Like Chandler's 
attorney, inexperienced attorneys may believe that preparing for the 
penalty trial will be unnecessary because the defendant will not be 
convicted of the capital offense at the guilt trial. In addition, because 
the attorney is seeking to maximize the defendant's chances at the 
guilt trial, she may decide that searching for mitigating evidence to be 
introduced at the penalty trial is not an optimal use of her limited 
resources. 
Even if the attorney believes that there is some chance that the 
defendant will be convicted of the capital offense and that introducing 
mitigating evidence at the penalty trial could be valuable, she may still 
believe that the proper overall strategy is to focus almost entirely on 
maximizing the defendant's chances at the guilt trial. When the 
attorney adopts this strategy, her options at the penalty trial (if it 
occurs) will generally be limited. In most cases, the failure to 
investigate mitigating evidence prior to the guilt trial will make it 
impossible to introduce significant mitigating evidence at the penalty 
trial. Since the penalty trial usually takes place immediately after the 
jury finds the defendant guilty of the capital offense, the defense will 
almost never have sufficient time between the guilty verdict and the 
beginning of the penalty trial to conduct the kind of investigation that 
would produce persuasive mitigating evidence. 
In other cases, either the defendant's wishes or the lawyer's view of 
the significance of the defendant's claim of innocence may shape the 
lawyer's strategy. A defendant who has a strong claim of innocence 
may be especially likely to tell his attorney that, in the event of a 
penalty trial, no mitigating evidence should be presented. The 
defendant may believe that, because he has a strong claim of 
innocence, all of his attorney's efforts should be directed toward 
securing his acquittal; if he is convicted, he doesn't care whether he is 
sentenced to death. He may even tell his attorney, "Free me or fry 
me." If the lawyer believes the client has a strong claim of innocence, 
moreover, she may conclude that seeking mitigating evidence is 
unnecessary because, even if the defendant is convicted, the best 
strategy at the penalty trial will be to focus exclusively on reasserting 
the defendant's claim of innocence. A lawyer familiar with death­
penalty scholarship may justify this strategy by pointing to empirical 
studies that show that a jury's lingering doubt as to the defendant's 
guilt is the factor that will most strongly lead them to spare the 
defendant's life.52 Based on these studies, the lawyer may assert that in 
51. See infra text accompanying note 138. 
52 See, e.g., William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or 
Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 27 (1988) 
(presenting interviews from jurors in ten Florida cases that indicated that jurors' lingering 
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appropriate cases it is best to argue solely on the ground of lingering 
doubt, thus maximizing the likelihood that the jury will spare the 
defendant's life on the basis of this factor. 
For more than two decades, however, experienced capital-defense 
attorneys have recognized that introducing mitigating evidence 
explaining the defendant's background and history to the penalty jury 
is generally the best way to dissuade the jury from imposing a death 
sentence.s3 As the Supreme Court observed in Wiggins v. Smith,s4 the 
1989 ABA Standards provide that an attorney representing a capital 
defendant has an obligation to investigate for "all reasonably available 
mitigating evidence" prior to trial.ss In view of these established 
professional norms, under what circumstances, if any, can a defense 
attorney representing a capital defendant with a strong claim of 
innocence reasonably conclude that she need not conduct an 
investigation for such evidence? And when the attorney makes this 
decision, under what circumstance will her failure to investigate 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel? 
Although one might think that the answers to these two questions 
would be the same, the Court's decisions in Strickland and its progeny 
indicate otherwise. In determining whether a capital-defense 
attorney's failure to investigate or to introduce mitigating evidence at 
a penalty trial is ineffective representation, courts must apply 
Strickland v. Washington's two-prong test56 for determining whether 
counsel was ineffective. As to the first prong - whether the attorney's 
representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" s7 
- Strickland requires courts to afford substantial deference to an 
attorney's strategic choices. The Strickland Court determined that 
strategic choices made after a full investigation of the facts and law are 
"virtually unchallengeable" and that "choices made after less than 
complete investigation are reasonable" if "reasonable professional 
judgments support the limitations on investigation." ss The Court 
added, moreover, that counsel's performance must be judged on the 
doubt as to the defendant's guilt was the most important factor to jurors who voted for life 
imprisonment). See generally Scott E. Sundby, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1577 n.44 (1998) 
(summarizing data relating to lingering doubt). 
53. See Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death 
Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 323-24, 335-37 (1983); Welsh S. White, Effective 
Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 
323, 341 -42, 361. 
54. 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
55. ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN 
DEATH PENALTY CASES Guideline 1 1 .4.l(C) (1989) [hereinafter 1989 GUIDELINES]. 
56. For an explanation of Strickland's two-prong test, see supra note 40. 
57. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
58. Id. at 690-91. 
2010 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 102:2001 
basis of "information supplied by the defendant. "59 Applying these 
standards, lower courts have frequently held that strategic choices not 
to seek or not to present mitigating evidence at the penalty trial will 
not constitute deficient performance when based on either instructions 
from the defendant,<10 or the attorney's view as to the importance of 
reasserting the defendant's claim of innocence at the penalty trial.61 
Wiggins v. Smith,62 however, took a different view. There, the 
Court made clear that in at least some situations, a capital defendant's 
attorney's failure to seek mitigating evidence cannot be justified by a 
strategic decision to focus on reasserting the defendant's claim of 
innocence at the penalty trial. The Court's analysis indicates that in 
evaluating a capital defendant's attorney's performance, the practices 
of experienced capital-defense attorneys, as reflected in professional 
standards such as the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and 
Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, will at least 
sometimes provide the norms against which the attorney's 
performance must be measured. In assessing the reasonableness of 
strategic choices by attorneys representing defendants with strong 
claims of innocence, it is thus appropriate to illuminate these norms 
through examining and explaining strategic choices made by defense 
attorneys who specialize in capital cases. 
In this Article, I will contrast the choices of defense attorneys with 
wide experience in capital cases with those made by defense attorneys 
who lack such experience, and assess Wiggins's possible impact on the 
question of whether the latter group's choices constitute deficient 
performance under the first prong of the Strickland test. Broadly 
stated, my thesis is that in representing capital defendants with a 
strong claim of innocence, certain axioms that govern the practices of 
experienced capital-defense attorneys should be viewed as 
professional norms, and, in most instances, a capital-defense attorney's 
failure to comply with these norms should constitute deficient 
performance within the meaning of Strickland. 
In developing this thesis, the Article proceeds as follows: Part I 
briefly explains Wiggins's holding and identifies and discusses three 
situations of particular concern in which Wiggins's application is 
59. Id. at 691. 
60. See, e.g. , Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002); Coleman v. 
Mitchell, 244 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1012 (2002); Frye v. Lee, 235 
F.3d 897 (4th Cir. 2000); Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1985); Wiiliams v. 
Calderon, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (C.D. Cal. 1998), aff d sub nom. Williams v. Woodford, 306 
F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2002); Zagorski v. State, 983 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn. 1998). 
61. See, e.g. , Parker v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 331 F.3d 764 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. 
denied, 1245 S. Ct. 1513 (2004); Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000); 
Tarver v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 710 (11th Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Kokoraleis v. Director 
of III. Dept. of Corr., 963 F. Supp. 1473, 1486-87 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
62. 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
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unclear. Parts II and III then seek to illuminate the appropriate 
standard of care for attorneys representing capital defendants with 
strong claims of innocence by considering the practices attorneys with 
varying levels of experience report using and eschewing when they 
deal with strategic choices relating to the penalty trial in capital cases. 
Part II addresses strategic choices that arise when a defense attorney 
representing a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence is 
preparing for the penalty trial, focusing especially on decisions that are 
influenced by the attorney's view of her resources or the instructions 
she has received from the capital defendant. Part Ill addresses 
strategic choices that arise when the attorney is deciding what type of 
mitigating evidence should be presented at the penalty trial, focusing 
first on the circumstances under which the attorney should argue 
lingering doubt to the penalty jury, and then on the effect that the 
attorney's decision to argue lingering doubt should have on her 
strategy with respect to introducing mitigating evidence. By drawing 
upon interviews with experienced capital-defense attorneys63 and 
penalty-trial transcripts64 that reveal the ways in which they implement 
their strategic choices, I approach these issues through the lens of 
choices that many expert attorneys found reasonable across the 
variety of circumstances that arose in actual cases. 
Drawing from various sources, including the material presented in 
Parts II and III, Part IV seeks to define the professional norms that 
should govern defense attorneys' strategic choices when they are 
representing capital defendants with strong claims of innocence. As I 
have indicated, my thesis is that these norms should not only serve as 
guides to defense attorneys but also as the standards that must be met 
when the attorney's performance is being measured against the first 
prong of the Strickland test. I conclude by commenting on some of the 
broader implications of the issues discussed in the Article. 
63. In preparing this Article I have interviewed twelve criminal-defense attorneys, most 
of whom have had extensive experience defending capital defendants (i.e., participating as a 
defense attorney in more than twenty capital cases), and two mitigation experts who have 
had extensive experience providing social histories (based on investigations for mitigating 
evidence) for capital defendants. When I rely on specific information provided by any of 
these people, the name of the person interviewed and the date of the interview appear in the 
footnote. 
64. The penalty-trial transcripts referred to (as well as others not quoted) were sent to 
me by attorneys or mitigation experts involved in the cases. These transcripts are on file with 
the author. 
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I. WIGGINS V. SMITH'S IMPACT ON COUNSEL'S STRATEGIC 
CHOICES 
In Wiggins v. Smith65 the Court considered an ineffective assistance 
of counsel case in which the reasonableness of a capital defendant's 
attorneys' decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence was 
at issue. The government sought to justify the attorneys' failure to 
conduct a full investigation for mitigating evidence on the ground that 
the attorneys had made a tactical choice to focus their penalty-trial 
strategy entirely on relitigating the defendant's guilt. The Court's 
refusal to accept the government's position throws into doubt at least 
some capital-defense attorneys' strategic choices to focus solely on 
lingering doubt or other innocence claims at the penalty trial. How 
many depends, in part, upon the extent to which the Wiggins holding 
extends beyond the particular facts of that case. It is thus useful to 
explain the Court's holding and to identify issues that the Court's 
opinion left unresolved before assessing Wiggins's immediate and 
long-term impact. 
A. The Wiggins Decision 
Kevin Wiggins was charged with the murder of Florence Lacs, a 
seventy-seven-year-old woman who was found drowned in the bathtub 
of her ransacked apartment in Woodlawn, Maryland, on September 
17, 1988.66 Ms. Lacs was last seen alive on the afternoon of September 
15 when a government witness said Wiggins thanked Ms. Lacs for 
watching his Sheetrock.67 Geraldine Armstrong, Wiggins's girlfriend, 
testified that Wiggins picked her up at about 7:45 p.m. on September 
15. At that time, Wiggins was driving Ms. Lacs's Chevette and was in 
possession of her credit card, which Wiggins and Armstrong used 
when they went shopping that evening and the next day.68 When 
Wiggins was arrested, he told the police that he had found Ms. Lacs's 
car with the keys in it in a restaurant parking lot on September 16 and 
that Armstrong "didn't have anything to do with this."69 The 
government also sought to establish through expert testimony and 
other evidence that Ms. Lacs had been murdered on September 15, 
65. 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
66. Id. at 514. 
67. Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629, 632-33 (4th Cir. 2002). 
68. Id. at 634. 
69. Id. 
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the same day on which Wiggins had been seen in the vicinity of her 
apartment.70 
The government's case was thus based primarily on evidence that 
Wiggins was seen near the victim's apartment shortly before the time 
of her murder and had possession of property taken from her 
apartment after the time of the murder.71 No eyewitnesses or forensic 
evidence supported the government's claim that Wiggins had been in 
Ms. Lacs's apartment on September 15. On the other hand, an 
unidentified fingerprint was found in the apartment and the police did 
have other possible suspects, especially Armstrong's brother, who 
lived just below Ms. Lacs's apartment.72 
The defense sought to refute the government's case by showing 
that Ms. Lacs was not dead when Wiggins was shown to be in 
possession of the property taken from her apartment. To establish this 
claim, Dr. Kaufmann, an expert in forensic pathology, testified that, 
"within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Mrs. Lacs' time of 
death was no earlier than 3 a.m. on Saturday, September 17."73 If Ms. 
Lacs had not been killed until September 17, the government's case 
against Wiggins was obviously insufficient to establish his guilt.74 
The defense elected to have the defendant's guilt determined by a 
judge sitting without a jury. The judge rejected Dr. Kaufman's 
conclusion as to the time of Ms. Lacs's death. He then concluded that 
Wiggins's possession of property taken from a recently murdered 
victim combined with the other circumstantial evidence was sufficient 
to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.75 
The defense chose to have Wiggins's penalty trial before a jury. In 
order to obtain a death sentence, the government had to prove that 
70. The medical examiner testified that the victim had been murdered and that the date 
of death could have been September 15. In addition, a friend of the victim's testified that on 
September 15 the victim had been wearing the clothes that were found on her murdered 
body on September 17, and Wiggins's employer testified that Wiggins had been working 
near the defendant's apartment on the afternoon of September 15. Id. at 632-34. 
71. In addition, two inmates testified that Wiggins confessed to the murder while 
incarcerated; in arriving at a verdict, however, the trial judge indicated that he did not 
believe either of these inmates. Id. at 634. 
72. See Wiggins v. Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538, 554 n.9, 557 (D. Md. 2001). 
73. Wiggins, 288 F.3d at 634. 
74. Even if the government's evidence relating to Ms. Lacs's time of death was accepted, 
the government's case against Wiggins was weak. Indeed, the federal district judge who 
considered the case on habeas concluded that Wiggins was entitled to relief on the ground 
that "no rational finder of fact could have found Wiggins guilty of murder beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Wiggins, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 554. 
75. In reaching this verdict, the trial judge relied on five factual findings: (1) Wiggins 
was in the vicinity of the apartment at the time of the murder; (2) he gave a false statement 
to the police about the stolen goods; (3) he knew the victim; (4) the victim was wearing the 
same clothes on September 15 as she was when she was found dead on September 17; (5) the 
victim's apartment had been ransacked. See id. at 555-56. 
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Wiggins was a "principal in the first degree," meaning that he actually 
killed Ms. Lacs76 and that the aggravating factors outweighed the 
mitigating factors.77 One month prior to the scheduled beginning of 
the penalty trial, defense counsel filed a motion for bifurcation of the 
penalty trial so that the defense could first present evidence showing 
that Wiggins did not kill Ms. Lacs and then, if necessary, present a 
mitigation case. The defense claimed that "separating the two cases 
would prevent the introduction of mitigating evidence from diluting 
their claim that Wiggins was not directly responsible for the murder. "78 
Approximately one month later, the judge denied the defense's 
bifurcation motion and the penalty trial began. In her opening 
statement, one of Wiggins's two defense attorneys told the jury they 
would "hear evidence suggesting that someone other than Wiggins 
actually killed Lacs. "79 She also told them they were going to hear 
evidence relating to Wiggins's life and that he had "had a difficult 
life."80 During the penalty trial, however, the defense introduced no 
evidence relating to Wiggins's life history.81 Instead, it again 
introduced expert testimony attacking the government's theory as to 
Ms. Lacs's time of death.82 In essence, the defense sought to convince 
the jury that Wiggins could not have "actually killed" the victim 
because he was not guilty of her murder. 
At the conclusion of the penalty trial, the judge instructed the jury 
that Wiggins had been convicted of the first-degree murder of Ms. 
Lacs and that they were required to accept that conviction as 
"binding" even if they believed it "to have been in error. "83 He then 
explained the standard for determining whether Wiggins was a 
"principal in the first degree" and instructed them that, if they found 
that Wiggins was a "principal in the first degree," they should 
determine whether the death penalty should be imposed by weighing 
76. Under Maryland's capital-sentencing statute, the jury may not impose the death 
penalty unless it first concludes that the defendant was a "principal in the first degree." MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIMINAL LAW§ 2-202(a)(2)(i) (2002). Under Maryland law, "(a] principal in 
the first degree is one who actually commits a crime, either by his own hand, or by an 
inanimate agency, or by an innocent human agent." State v. Ward, 396 A.2d 1041, 1046 (Md. 
1978). 
77. MD. CODE. ANN., CRIMINAL LAW§ 2-203(i)(2)(i) (2002) (stating that a jury must 
determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the aggravating circumstances outweigh 
the mitigating evidence). 
78. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 515. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 515-16. 
83. Joint Appendix of Petitioner and Respondent at 369, Wiggins v. Smith. 
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the aggravating and mitigating factors.84 The jury imposed a death 
sentence.s5 
Wiggins claimed that his trial attorneys were ineffective because 
they failed to conduct a full investigation for mitigating evidence 
relating to Wiggins's personal history.86 Wiggins's attorneys had 
obtained some information relating to his background, including a 
presentence investigation report prepared by the Division of Parole 
and Probation and DSS records "documenting [Wiggins's] various 
placements in the State's foster care system."s7 They had not, however, 
retained a forensic social worker to prepare a full compilation of 
Wiggins's social history, even though funds for that purpose were 
available.ss Wiggins's senior attorney explained that the attorneys had 
decided, well in advance of trial, "to focus their efforts on 'retrying the 
factual case' and disputing Wiggins' direct responsibility for the 
murder."s9 They thus believed that compiling a social history was 
unnecessary because they did not want to present a shot-gun defense 
that might dilute the force of the evidence disputing Wiggins's 
responsibility .90 
The Maryland state courts rejected Wiggins's ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim, concluding that his attorneys had made a "deliberate, 
tactical" decision to concentrate their efforts on convincing the 
penalty jury that Wiggins was not responsible for the murder.91 
Wiggins challenged this ruling in a federal writ of habeas corpus.92 In 
view of the applicable federal habeas statute,93 the issue before the 
Supreme Court was whether the Maryland state courts' ruling denying 
Wiggins's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was an "unreasonable 
application of clearly established federal law."94 In order to establish 
this, Wiggins first had to show that his attorneys' decision to curtail 
investigation so that they did not have Wiggins's complete social 
84. Id. 
85. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 516. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 523. 
88. Id. at 524. 
89. Id. at 517. 
90. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 517. 
91. Id. at 518. 
92. Id. 
93. 28 u.s.c. § 2254 (1996). 
94. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 518 (quoting Wiggins v. Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538, 557 (D. 
Md. 2001)); id. at 520. 
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history was deficient performance under the first prong of the 
Strickland test.95 
In Strickland, the Court had said that "strategic choices made after 
less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent 
that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on 
investigation. "96 The Wiggins Court thus had to determine whether 
Wiggins's attorneys' strategy of curtailing investigation so as to focus 
on relitigating the defendant's guilt was reasonable. 
In addressing this issue, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion 
focused on a capital-defense attorney's obligation to investigate for 
mitigating evidence. Justice O'Connor stated that Wiggins's attorneys' 
decision to curtail the investigation "fell short of the professional 
standards that prevailed in Maryland in 1989" because "standard 
practice in Maryland in capital cases" at that time "included the 
preparation of a social history report."97 She indicated, moreover, that 
Wiggins's attorneys' decision could not be attributed to lack of 
resources because "the Public Defender's office made funds available 
for the retention of a forensic social worker" who would prepare the 
necessary report.98 
The majority also observed that " [t]he ABA Guidelines provide 
that investigations into mitigating evidence 'should comprise efforts to 
discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence,'  "99 adding that 
based on both the ABA Guidelines and the ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice, this investigation should delve into various topics, 
including the defendant's "family and social history." 100 Justice 
O'Connor referred to these standards as "well-defined norms,"101 thus 
implying that, in the absence of a reasonable justification for a defense 
attorney's failure to conduct an investigation into reasonably available 
mitigating evidence, the attorney's failure to conduct such an 
investigation would constitute deficient performance under Strickland. 
Justice O'Connor further concluded that Wiggins's attorneys' 
decision to curtail investigation could not be justified as a reasonable 
95. In addition, Wiggins had to show that his attorneys' deficient performance 
constituted prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland test. See supra note 40. In 
order to obtain relief under§ 2254(d)(l), moreover, Wiggins had to show that the Maryland 
state court's conclusion that the defendant had not established that his attorney's 
performance was deficient constituted an "unreasonable application of federal law." 
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 518 (quoting Wiggins v. Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538, 557 (D. Md. 
2001)). 
96. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. 
97. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
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strategic decision; rather, the attorneys' decision to abandon their 
investigation when they did " [made] a fully informed decision with 
respect to sentencing strategy impossible."102 
B. Three Unresolved Issues 
Although Wiggins simply applied Strickland's ineffective assistance 
of counsel test, the Court's analysis indicates that its view of the 
standard of care required by an attorney representing a capital 
defendant may have evolved since Strickland was decided in 1984.103 
Although in Strickland the Court implied that professional standards 
such as those articulated in the ABA Guidelines would not necessarily 
define the standard of care for criminal-defense attorneys,104 the 
Wiggins majority indicated that at least the ABA Guidelines relating 
to a capital defendant's attorney's obligation to investigate for "all 
reasonably available mitigating evidence" does articulate the standard 
of care for a defense attorney representing a capital defendant. 
Furthermore, the defense attorney may not trump this obligation by 
simply asserting that she adopted a strategy that focused exclusively 
on reasserting the defendant's possible innocence at the penalty trial. 
In assessing Wiggins's application to other situations in which a 
capital-defense attorney curtails investigation because she opts for a 
strategy of reasserting a claim of innocence at the penalty trial, three 
questions seem especially significant. First, in defining counsel's duty 
to investigate for mitigating evidence, what does the Court mean by 
"all reasonably available mitigating evidence?" Second, can a capital­
defense attorney justify a decision to curtail investigation for 
mitigating evidence because of the defendant's request that no such 
evidence be presented at the penalty trial? And, third, when may the 
attorney make a reasonable decision to curtail investigation (or not to 
present mitigating evidence) on the basis of a strategic choice that 
relates to the quality of the available mitigating evidence? 
1. The Duty to Investigate for "All Reasonably A vailable Mitigating 
Evidence" 
As explained by the Court, Wiggins provides a clear example of a 
case in which the mitigating evidence that counsel failed to investigate 
was "reasonably available." At the time of Wiggins's trial, "the Public 
Defender's office made funds available for the retention of a forensic 
102. Id. at 527-28. 
103. For the argument that the standard of care required by a capital defendant's 
attorney would evolve as the Court became more familiar with the practices of experienced 
capital-defense attorneys, see White, supra note 53. 
104. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. 
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social worker"105 who would prepare a report relating to the 
defendant's background. Using funds to obtain such a report would 
not have affected the extent to which counsel would have resources 
available for the guilt trial because the guilt trial had already been 
completed. In Wiggins, the mitigating evidence was thus "reasonably 
available" not only because counsel could obtain it but also because it 
could be obtained without any strain on existing resources. 
In other cases, the availability of potential mitigating evidence will 
not be so clear. In most jurisdictions, judges have discretion as to the 
amount of funds to be allocated to capital-defense attorneys for 
investigation.106 In exercising this discretion, judges may limit the 
number of expert witnesses or inform the attorney that the total 
amount of funds for investigation cannot exceed a certain amount. 107 
105. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524. 
106. In most states, statutes provide judges with wide discretion as to the expenses to be 
allocated for the investigation and preparation of a capital case. See, e.g. , CAL. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 987.9 (West Supp. 2004) (allowing counsel to request funds for payment of 
"investigators, experts, and others for the preparation or presentation of the defense" and 
stating that "a judge . . .  shall rule on the reasonableness of the request and shall disburse an 
appropriate amount of money to defendant's attorney"); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 40-14-207(b) 
(2003) (authorizing court to grant authorization for "investigative or expert services or other 
similar services" necessary to protect defendant's constitutional rights "in a reasonable 
amount to be determined by the court"); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.052(f)-(g) (Supp. 
2004) (allowing counsel to request and court to grant reasonable "advance payment of 
expenses to investigate potential defenses"). See generally Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal 
Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Equal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are 
at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 820 (claiming that judges routinely use their 
discretion to deny defense counsel the funds needed to adequately investigate a case and 
often do so by requiring counsel to show the need for such funds - "a showing that 
frequently cannot be made without the very . . .  assistance that is sought"). 
107. See, e.g. , United States v. Hurn, 52 M.J. 629, 633 (1999) (holding that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint a mitigation specialist when the court had 
already appointed a psychologist) ,  aff d on other grounds, 58 M.J. 199 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 
2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 416 (2003); Commonwealth v. Shabazz, Nos. CR03000337-00 & 
CR02-856, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 74 (Mar. 31, 2003) (finding that the trial court properly 
limited mitigation specialist to twenty hours to establish a factual basis for a full investigation 
for mitigating evidence); State v. Daniel, No. W2000-00981-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. 
App. LEXIS 967, at *33-34 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 28, 2001) (holding that trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint a mitigation specialist because defendant failed 
to make the required showing that (1) defendant would be deprived of a fair trial without 
such assistance and (2) there was a reasonable likelihood that such assistance would 
materially assist the defense). But see Williams v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1372, 1384 (Ind. 1996) 
(finding abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to limit a mitigation specialist to 
twenty-five hours of investigation, but establishing no clear standards for determining when 
a judge's failure to authorize a defense investigation will constitute an abuse of discretion). 
The judge's authority to exercise discretion under these statutes is limited, however, by 
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1975), which holds that, upon a sufficient showing that his 
mental condition will be a significant factor in a capital case, a capital defendant is entitled to 
compensation for a psychiatrist to assist the defense. Lower courts have interpreted A ke as 
requiring compensation of other defense experts upon an adequate showing that they are 
needed to assist the defense in developing a significant issue. See White, supra note 53, at 
342. Under A ke, a judge should not be permitted to limit the number of expert witnesses or 
to limit the compensation for experts if the defense makes a sufficient showing that an 
expert is needed to develop a particular type of mitigation evidence. Jn practice, however, 
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In cases where a capital defendant has a strong claim of innocence, his 
attorney may believe - rightly or wrongly - that she should opt for 
presenting the strongest defense at the guilt stage rather than 
diminishing the resources available for that purpose by requesting 
funds to investigate for mitigating evidence.108 In this situation, the 
attorney may opt either not to investigate for mitigating evidence at all 
or to curtail the investigation for mitigating evidence so as not to 
diminish the resources available for strengthening the defendant's 
defense at the guilt stage. 
In applying Wiggins to these situations, courts will have to decide 
whether counsel's obligation to investigate for "all reasonably 
available mitigating evidence" encompasses an obligation to seek to 
obtain all such evidence or only an obligation to seek "mitigating 
evidence" that can be obtained without placing a strain on the 
resources available for other purposes. 
2. The Defendant Instructs the Attorney Not to Look for Mitigating 
Evidence 
In Wiggins, there was no indication that the defendant had given 
his attorneys any instructions relating to investigating or introducing 
mitigating evidence. In cases where a capital defendant has a strong 
claim of innocence, however, it is not unusual for the defendant to 
instruct the attorney that she is neither to investigate mitigating 
evidence nor to present it at the penalty trial in the event the 
defendant is convicted at the guilt trial.109 In addition, at some point 
during pretrial preparation, the defendant may instruct the attorney 
either to stop investigating mitigating evidence entirely or to curtail 
some particular aspect of the investigation, such as interviewing 
members of the defendant's family. While lower courts have 
addressed various situations in which a capital defendant instructed his 
attorney to curtail investigation into mitigating evidence,1 10 Wiggins 
did not involve such a situation and the Court did not indicate whether 
Wiggins's holding would apply in such cases. 
prior to Wiggins, "many defense lawyers [did] not do a good job of mak[ing] a showing of 
the need for funds." Email from Stephen Bright to author (Aug. 31,  2003) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Bright email]. For further discussion of Ake, see notes 268-270 infra and 
accompanying text. 
108. In some cases, the defense attorney's belief that she must choose between 
allocating resources to the guilt and penalty stages may be mistaken. If the attorney can 
make an sufficient showing under Ake, arguably she should be entitled to compensation for 
expert witnesses at the penalty trial regardless of the funds already expended for expert 
witnesses at the guilt trial. See supra note 107. 
109. See, e.g. , infra notes 150-153 and accompanying text (describing one such case). 
1 10. See infra notes 274-282 and accompanying text. 
2020 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:2001 
3. Strategic Choices to Ignore Potential Mitigating Evidence 
At Wiggins's post-conviction hearing, Wiggins's senior attorney 
explained the attorneys' decision to curtail investigation, testifying 
that prior to trial they decided not to introduce mitigating evidence 
relating to the defendant's background because they did not want to 
dilute his claim of innocence.1 1 1  
In Strickland and at least two later cases112 the Court held that, 
under the circumstances presented in those cases, a capital defendant's 
attorney's decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence was 
a reasonable strategic decision and, therefore, did not constitute 
deficient performance. In Wiggins, on the other hand, the Court held 
that, assuming Wiggins's attorneys' decision to curtail investigation 
was a strategic decision, the decision was unreasonable. The question 
remains whether, under Wiggins, a decision to curtail investigation and 
instead emphasize evidence related to innocence can ever be 
reasonable. If so, when? 
Characterizing Wiggins's attorneys' decision as strategic is 
questionable. As the Court indicated,113 if the attorneys' bifurcation 
motion filed prior to the penalty trial had been granted, the attorneys 
would not have had to worry about the possibility of diluting the 
evidence of Wiggins's innocence that was presented at the penalty 
trial. The attorneys would have been able to introduce that evidence 
during the first phase of the bifurcated proceeding and, if that strategy 
was unsuccessful, introduce mitigating evidence relating to the 
defendant's background at the second phase.1 14 As the Court stated,115 
there was thus reason to believe that the attorneys' decision was based 
on "inattention" rather than strategy.116 Should the Court desire to 
limit its holding in Wiggins, it could distinguish Wiggins from other 
situations in which a capital-defense attorney curtails investigation for 
mitigating evidence on the ground that in Wiggins the attorneys' 
decision to curtail investigation was not really a strategic choice, but 
rather a result of inattention or incompetence. 
1 1 1. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 517. 
1 12. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794-95 (1987); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 
168 (1986). 
113. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 515-16. 
114. Id. at 526. 
115. Id. at 534. 
1 16. Id. at 526. At the opening of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel "entreated the 
jury to consider not just what Wiggins 'is found to have done,' but also 'who [he] is.' " Id. 
She then informed the jury that it "would 'hear that Kevin Wiggins has had a difficult life.' " 
Id. Despite these comments, however, counsel never presented any evidence relating to 
"Wiggins' history." Id. 
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The majority stated, however, that "assuming [Wiggins's attorneys] 
limited the scope of their investigation for strategic reasons,"117 their 
decision was unreasonable. To justify this conclusion, Justice 
O'Connor explained that the attorneys' decision to abandon their 
investigation when they did " [made] a fully informed decision with 
respect to sentencing strategy impossible. "118 
But why would it be unreasonable for the attorneys to decide that 
they would curtail the investigation into Wiggins's background 
because they wanted to focus exclusively on relitigating his guilt? The 
attorneys' reasoning might be as follows: (1) The evidence of the 
defendant's innocence was so strong that it was likely to have a 
powerful effect on the sentencing jury; (2) Presenting mitigating 
evidence relating to the defendant's background might dilute the 
strength of that evidence, making it less likely that the jury would 
spare the defendant because of its lingering doubt as to his guilt; (3) 
Therefore, pursuing mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's 
background was unnecessary because the attorneys would not choose 
to introduce such evidence at the penalty trial. 
The majority's analysis indicates that this type of reasoning is 
untenable. Justice O'Connor concluded that competent performance 
in the Wiggins case required a fuller investigation because in view of 
"the strength of the available evidence, a reasonable attorney might 
well have chosen to prioritize the mitigation case over the 
responsibility challenge," or at least to adopt both "sentencing 
strategies" since they were "not necessarily mutually exclusive."1 19 In 
other words, regardless of the attorneys' assessment of the strength of 
the evidence showing Wiggins's innocence, the attorneys could not 
automatically opt for a strategy that focused solely on presenting this 
evidence. The Court's analysis thus suggests that, at least in the 
absence of an adequate investigation, a capital-defense attorney's 
decision to rely solely on relitigating the defendant's guilt at the 
penalty trial is unreasonable. 
The majority was less clear, however, in delineating the 
circumstances under which a capital defendant's attorney can make 
the strategic decision to curtail investigation because her preliminary 
investigation convinces her that a full investigation for mitigating 
evidence would be unproductive. In Wiggins, the preliminary 
investigation indicated that the potential mitigating evidence related 
to the defendant's troubled childhood and severe mental problems.120 
Wiggins thus indicates that, in the absence of a substantial 
1 17. Id. at 527. 
1 18. Id. at 527-28. 
1 19. Id. at 535 
120. Id. 
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investigation, an attorney's strategic decision to reject the possibility 
of introducing this type of mitigating evidence is unreasonable. The 
Court's analysis does not suggest, however, that an attorney could 
never reasonably make a strategic choice to curtail investigation 
because she concluded that seeking additional mitigating evidence 
would be unproductive. On the contrary, the Court intimated that an 
attorney would be able to justify such a choice in cases where the 
attorney could reasonably conclude that she would not want to 
introduce potential mitigating evidence because of a concern that it 
would be unproductive or double-edged. 121 
Based on Wiggins's holding and analysis, the circumstances under 
which a capital defendant's attorney's strategic choice to curtail an 
investigation for mitigating evidence will constitute deficient 
performance is thus also unclear. 
II. PREPARING FOR THE PENALTY TRIAL 
A. The Division of Responsibility Between Lawyer and Client 
In representing a criminal defendant, a defense attorney must 
ordinarily be guided by her client with respect to the nature of the 
defenses presented. 122 If the defendant tells his attorney to present a 
defense at the guilt stage, the attorney will ordinarily be required to 
present that defense, even though she is convinced that it is very 
weak.123 Similarly, if a competent capital defendant insists that the 
attorney present no evidence at the penalty stage in the event he is 
convicted of the capital offense, the attorney must adhere to her 
121. The Court cited with apparent approval earlier cases in which it had held that a 
capital defendant's attorney's decision to curtail investigation was reasonable because the 
attorney reasonably concluded that the evidence likely to be disclosed by further 
investigation would be double-edged or unproductive. See id. at 2537 (citing Burger v. Kemp, 
483 U.S. 776 (1987); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986); Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984)). 
122. With respect to a lawyer's responsibilities, most states now follow the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1 .2(a) provides that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's 
decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . .  shall consult with the client as 
to the means by which they are to be pursued." For statutes codifying this rule, see, for 
example, N.C. REV. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003); PA. RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. l.2(a) (2003). The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which was 
replaced by the ABA Model Rules in most states but is still followed in a few states, also 
requires that attorneys pursue their clients' desired course of action. See MODEL CODE OF 
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-5 (1983). 
123. However, an attorney cannot assist her client in "conduct that [she] knows is . . .  
fraudulent." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1 .2(d) (2003). The ABA defines 
"fraudulent" as "conduct that . . .  has a purpose to deceive." Id. at R. 1 .0. Thus, an attorney 
cannot follow a client's directive to present a defense that he or she knows to be false. For 
states codifying this rule, see, for example, N.C. REV. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) 
(2003); PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1 .2(d) (2003). 
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client's wishes. 124 In practice, however, while the defendant makes the 
final decision, the defendant's attorney will often be able to exert 
influence that will significantly affect that decision. David Bruck, a 
South Carolina defense attorney who has participated in hundreds of 
capital cases and is now a Federal Death Penalty Resource Attorney 
who advises attorneys appointed to represent federal capital 
defendants, states that one of a criminal-defense attorney's most 
important roles is to "make an assessment of the strength of the 
defendant's various possible defenses and to advise the defendant as 
to which of those defenses should be presented to the jury and how 
they should be presented."125 When the defendant initially asserts an 
implausible claim of innocence, for example, an experienced defense 
attorney will often be able to dissuade the defendant from asserting 
that claim at trial. 
When a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence directs 
his attorney not to investigate or introduce mitigating evidence at the 
possible penalty trial, however, the psychological dynamics involved 
are likely to be more complex. In this situation, the defendant's 
position probably emanates from his belief that he should not be 
convicted of the capital offense. He thus believes that his attorney's 
focus should be exclusively on presenting the strongest possible 
defense at the guilt trial. If the attorney insists on preparing for the 
penalty trial, the defendant may resent the implied suggestion that a 
penalty trial may be necessary. His response may be, "I told you I was 
innocent. If you are preparing for the penalty trial, that means you 
don't believe I am innocent. If you don't trust me when I tell you I am 
innocent, I don't trust you to represent me when my life is at stake."126 
If the defendant is forced to contemplate the possibility of a conviction 
at the guilt stage, moreover, he may be inclined to believe that, if the 
jury confounds his expectations at the guilt trial, he doesn't care what 
happens at the penalty trial. In fact, it is not uncommon for defendants 
with strong claims of innocence to say to their attorneys, "I don't want 
124. For example, in Zagorski v. State, the defendant told his attorney before trial that 
"if convicted, he preferred death instead of a possible life sentence." Zagorski v. State, 983 
S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tenn. 1998). He then instructed counsel neither to investigate nor present 
mitigating evidence. Id. The defendant remained firm in his decision, even after his attorney 
informed him "about the importance of and the need to investigate" for mitigating evidence. 
Id. The attorney then followed the defendant's instructions. Id. at 655. The Supreme Court 
of Tennessee held that counsel acted reasonably. The court stated that "when a competent 
and fully informed defendant instructs counsel not to investigate or present mitigating 
evidence at trial, counsel will not later be adjudged ineffective for following those 
instructions." Id. at 657. 
125. Telephone Interview with David Bruck, Federal Death Penalty Resource Attorney 
for South Carolina (Apr. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Bruck Interview] (notes on file with author). 
126. Email from Michael Millman to author (Nov. 10, 2003) (on file with author). For 
approaches through which a capital-defense attorney may effectively counter this response, 
see infra text accompanying notes 145-149. 
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you to present any evidence at the penalty trial. If the jury convicts 
me, I'd rather die than be sent to prison."127 
B .  The Difference Between Experienced and Inexperienced Capita/­
Defense Attorneys 
A capital-defense attorney's approach to the issues presented in 
this scenario is likely to vary depending on the extent of her 
experience with capital cases. Criminal attorneys lacking experience in 
capital cases will be naturally inclined toward focusing their energies 
almost exclusively on the guilt trial. Stephen Bright, the Director of 
the Southern Center for Human Rights, who specializes in capital 
cases, explains that these defense attorneys, who are usually skilled 
and experienced at raising issues of reasonable doubt in noncapital 
cases, are unfamiliar with the capital-defense attorney's role of 
arguing for the defendant's life at the penalty stage of a capital trial.128 
In fact, these lawyers may perceive that Bright's view of the lawyer's 
role at the penalty trial - finding the social and biographical evidence 
relating to the defendant's life and then presenting it to the jury in a 
way that will "humanize" the defendant so that the jury has a fuller 
understanding of who the defendant is, where he has come from, and 
why he is the way he is129 - is "a job that should be done by a social 
worker rather than a lawyer."130 When a lawyer with this perspective 
has a client who requests that she focus primarily or exclusively on the 
guilt trial, lawyers lacking experience in capital cases will be inclined 
to minimize the extent to which they prepare for the penalty trial, 
using the client's instructions to justify a focus they might make in any 
event.131 
In addition, criminal-defense lawyers lacking experience in capital 
cases may dismiss the importance of preparing for the penalty trial 
127. Telephone Interview with Richard Jaffe (Mar. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Jaffe Interview] 
(notes on file with author). 
128. Telephone Interview with Stephen Bright (Mar. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Bright 
Interview] (notes on file with author). 
129. Attorneys with experience in capital cases have long recognized the importance of 
introducing mitigating evidence that will humanize the capital defendant, thereby leading 
the penalty jury to empathize with the defendant. See, e.g. , Goodpaster, supra note 53, at 
321-24, 335-37; White, supra note 53, at 361. For an account of a recent capital case in which 
a capital defendant's attorney was able to obtain a life sentence for his client by presenting 
evidence at the penalty trial that traced the defendant's troubled history, thereby obtaining 
the penalty jury's empathy, see Alex Kotlowitz, In the Face of Death, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 
2003, (Magazine), at 32. 
130. Bright Interview, supra note 128. 
131. Bright email, supra note 107. Bright points out that, even if the client does not give 
the lawyer any instructions, lawyers lacking experience in capital cases will tend to focus 
disproportionately on the guilt trial and not enough on the penalty trial because they are 
"more comfortable with the guilt phase." Id. 
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because they share their client's view that he will be acquitted of the 
capital offense. Michael Burt, a former federal death-penalty resource 
counselor who frequently advises attorneys representing capital 
defendants,132 says that lawyers with experience in ordinary criminal 
cases, but not in capital cases, often "grossly underestimate the 
difficulty in convincing a death-qualified jury that there is a reasonable 
doubt as to the defendant's guilt."133 Burt states that "death-qualified 
juries do not evaluate evidence in the same way as other juries and are 
thus much more likely than other juries to credit the prosecution's 
evidence and less likely to acquit the defendant or to find him guilty of 
a lesser [i.e. ,  noncapital] offense."134 Others with wide experience in 
capital cases not only share Burt's view but state that death-qualified 
juries' conviction proneness (i.e. ,  its tendency to convict more readily 
than a non-death-qualified jury) has increased in recent years.135 
Experienced practitioners have a sense that in recent years increasing 
doubts about the death penalty have led to the exclusion of more fair­
minded people from death-qualified juries.136 As a result, capital 
defendants are "losing more good jurors than ever."137 
132. From 1989 to 2002, Burt was head trial attorney in the San Francisco Public 
Defender's Office. Telephone Interview with Michael Burt (Mar. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Burt 
Interview] (notes on file with author). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Michael Charlton, a Texas attorney who has participated in dozens of capital cases, 
for example, stated that with respect to determining issues related to guilt or innocence, "the 
difference between ordinary juries and death-qualified juries is far greater than most people 
realize." Telephone Interview with Michael Charlton (Mar. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Charlton 
Interview] (notes on file with author). A death-qualified jury is one in which the prosecutor 
is allowed to exclude potential jurors on the ground that their opposition to capital 
punishment impairs their ability to render a proper verdict on a capital defendant's guilt or 
punishment. For an explanation of the current law relating to death-qualification, see note 
136 infra. For data relating to the differences between death-qualified and non-death­
qualified juries, see generally Mike Allen et al., Impact of Juror A ttitudes About the Death 
Penalty on Juror Evaluations of Guilt and Punishment: A Meta-Analysis, 22 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 715, 725 (1998) (providing analysis of studies relating to death-qualifying the jury 
indicating that the death qualification process produces juries that in comparison to the 
normal population have "a 44% increased probability . . .  to vote for conviction"). 
136. In most jurisdictions, the rule allowing the government to have a death-qualified 
jury took root during the nineteenth century. In order to obtain jurors who would not refuse 
to convict or to sentence a capital defendant to death because of their opposition to capital 
punishment, the prosecutor was permitted to exclude veniremen whose scruples about 
capital punishment might render them incapable of voting for a conviction or a death 
sentence in a capital case. See Stanton D. Krauss, The Witherspoon Doctrine at Witt's End: 
Death-Qualification Reexamined, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1986). In Witherspoon v. 
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), the Court limited the prosecutor's right to exclude such 
veniremen to cases in which the veniremen made it unmistakably clear that their views 
against capital punishment would lead them to vote automatically against the death penalty 
or to decline to impose a verdict that could result in a death sentence. In Wainwright v. Witt, 
469 U.S. 412 (1985), however, the Court sharply limited Witherspoon, holding that a 
prosecutor may exclude a venireman when there is sufficient evidence that her views on 
capital punishment would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of [her] duties as 
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Defense attorneys who are unaware of this difference may 
mistakenly believe that their ability to convince the jury of a 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt will obviate the necessity 
for a penalty trial. Indeed, Burt states that it is not unusual for 
attorneys who lack experience in such cases to "talk themselves into 
thinking they don't have to worry about the penalty phase because 
they have a great shot of winning the case."138 Burt adds that some 
lawyers soliciting his advice have asked him to "validate their 
decision" not to seek mitigating evidence in preparation for the 
penalty phase of a capital trial because their clients, who are 
presenting claims of innocence at the guilt trial, do not want them to 
present such evidence. 139 Indeed, even some attorneys who have had 
experience in capital cases can remember capital cases in which they 
did no preparation for the penalty trial because they believed that 
their client's strong claim of innocence would prevail at the guilt 
trial.140 
Burt and other attorneys who specialize in capital cases 
unequivocally reject this approach.141 Because they are aware that 
even a defendant with a strong claim of innocence may be found guilty 
of a capital offense, these attorneys state that a lawyer representing a 
capital defendant should always prepare for the penalty trial. At a 
minimum, the lawyer should prepare a social history of the client.142 
This history, which can generally be best assembled by an expert who 
has a background in psychology or social work, will trace the 
defendant's life from birth (or in some cases even before he was born) 
a juror" with respect to applying the law relating to the circumstances under which the 
defendant should be convicted of a capital crime or sentenced to death. Id. at 424 (quoting 
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). For a detailed analysis of Witherspoon and Witt, see 
Krauss supra. 
137. Interview with Russell Stetler (June 5, 2003) [hereinafter Stetler Interview] (notes 
on file with author). Stetler is the director of Investigation and Mitigation for the New York 
State Defender Organization. He supervises investigators and mitigators in all capital cases 
handled by his office. 
138. Burt Interview, supra note 132. For a fuller explanation of Burt's view on this 
point, see Michael N. Burt, Overview: Effective Capital Representation in the Twenty-First 
Century, in 1 CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY DEFENSE MANUAL 7 (1998 ed.). 
139. Burt Interview, supra note 132. 
140. Michael Charlton remembered at least one case in which he and the other defense 
attorneys representing a Texas capital defendant decided to do no preparation for the 
penalty stage of the case because they were confident that the defendant would be acquitted. 
Even though that defendant was in fact acquitted, Charlton said that his present policy is to 
prepare for the penalty trial whenever he represents a capital defendant. In addition, he 
stated that he would make every attempt to pursue this policy even if his client stated that he 
did not want to have mitigating evidence presented at the penalty trial. Charlton Interview, 
supra note 135. 
141 . Bright Interview, supra note 128; Burt Interview, supra note 132. 
142. Bright Interview, supra note 128; Burt Interview, supra note 132. 
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to the present.143 The history should be based on a wealth of data: 
information provided by the defendant's family members and people 
who have known him during the various stages of his life, the 
defendant's school and other institutional records, reports from 
mental-health professionals or other experts who have examined the 
defendant, and other relevant data.144 One of the purposes of the 
social history is to provide defense counsel with potential mitigating 
evidence to be presented at the penalty trial. 
A capital defendant who objects to the idea of introducing 
mitigating evidence at the penalty trial is, of course, likely also to 
object to the idea of preparing a social history that includes potential 
mitigating evidence. Experienced capital-defense attorneys say that 
there are at least two ways to deal with such objections:145 If the 
defendant would agree that a death sentence is a worse alternative 
than a life sentence, the attorney can emphasize to the client that it is 
"always necessary to prepare for the worst."146 The attorney might tell 
her client that, even though she is hopeful that the defendant's trial 
defense will be successful, she wants to be prepared for every 
contingency. Therefore, it is essential that the attorney be prepared to 
present persuasive mitigating evidence at the penalty trial in the event 
the defendant is found guilty of the capital offense. 
In addition, the defense attorney can truthfully tell her client that 
investigating the defendant's background may lead to evidence that 
will assist the defense at the guilt stage.147 Witnesses who are familiar 
with the defendant may be able to testify to his good character, 
thereby convincing the jury that the defendant is simply not the kind 
of person who could have committed the crime.148 Or, if the 
government is introducing the defendant's incriminating statements to 
establish his guilt, evidence relating to the defendant's mental 
problems may be used to cast doubt on his statements' reliability.149 
143. For examples of social histories compiled by mitigation experts, see White, supra 
note 53, at 325-29. In order to compile an adequate social history, the mitigation expert will 
often need the assistance of other court-appointed experts. See id. at 342-44. 
144. See id. at 341-42. 
145. Bright Interview, supra note 128; Burt Interview, supra note 132. 
146. Burt Interview, supra note 132. 
147. Id. ; Telephone Interview with Gary Taylor, Austin, Tex., Attorney for capital 
defendants, (Mar. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Taylor Interview] (notes on file with author). 
148. A defendant in a criminal case is allowed to have witnesses testify to his good 
character for the purpose of showing that, in view of his character traits, he was less likely to 
have committed the crime charged. Character witnesses often testify to the defendant's 
peaceful reputation, for example, for the purpose of showing the defendant was less likely to 
have attacked the victim. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Watkins, 843 A.2d 1203 (Pa. 2003). 
149. Interview with John Niland, Federal Death Penalty Resource Attorney for Texas 
(Mar. 11 ,  2003) [hereinafter Niland Interview] (notes on file with author). For an analysis of 
cases in which capital defendants with mental problems were convicted on the basis of 
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When dealing with a capital defendant who persists in objecting to 
the introduction of mitigating evidence at the penalty trial, 
experienced capital-defense attorneys will sometimes exert 
considerable pressure on the defendant to change his mind. Richard 
Jaffe, an Alabama defense attorney who has represented dozens of 
capital defendants, provides an example. Jaffe was appointed to 
represent Gary Drinkard at his retrial for a capital offense. At his first 
trial, Drinkard, who consistently maintained his innocence, had been 
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. During the penalty trial 
in that case, Drinkard's attorney presented no mitigating evidence 
because Drinkard had instructed him not to.150 After Drinkard's 
conviction and death sentence were reversed,151 Jaffe and two other 
attorneys represented Drinkard at his second trial.152 
While these attorneys were preparing for Drinkard's second trial, 
Drinkard indicated that, if he was again convicted of the capital 
offense, he still did not want to have any mitigating evidence 
presented at the penalty trial. 153 He stated that he would rather be 
executed than spend the rest of his life in prison.154 When Jaffe was 
informed of this, he met with Drinkard for the first time. He told 
Drinkard that they had a great defense team and that he thought the 
investigation and preparation for trial was going very well. He then 
told Drinkard that he could not continue to be a part of the defense 
team if Drinkard persisted in his refusal to have mitigating evidence 
introduced at a possible penalty trial. When Drinkard asked why, Jaffe 
replied, "I don't defend people who want to die."155 Drinkard then 
changed his mind and signed an agreement that stated that he was 
willing to have his attorneys present mitigating evidence on his behalf 
in the event that there was a penalty trial. The agreement was 
ultimately irrelevant, however, because Drinkard was acquitted at his 
second trial. 156 
The pressure exerted by Jaffe on Drinkard may seem aggressive. 
Stephen Bright observes, however, that capital-defense attorneys will 
often have to be very forceful in dealing with defendants who do not 
want to have evidence presented at the penalty trial. Logic and other 
police-induced false confessions, see Welsh S. White, Confessions in Capital Cases, 2003 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 601. 
150. See Ex parte Gary Drinkard, 777 So. 2d 295, 296 (Ala. 2000). 
151. See id. (reversing a conviction because evidence of prior bad acts was improperly 
admitted at trial). 
152. Jaffe Interview, supra note 127. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
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persuasive techniques that might be successful in other contexts are 
less likely to be successful with such defendants because they may be 
incapable of either focusing on the penalty trial or understanding the 
impact that the failure to prepare for that trial may have on the jury's 
ultimate decision. In Bright's judgment, however, the "failure to 
prepare for the penalty trial" is not a viable option because 
introducing mitigating evidence that "will provide the jury with an in­
depth understanding of the defendant" and the people connected to 
him is generally the only way that defense counsel can avoid a death 
sentence. 157 When there is a disagreement between the attorney and 
the client, it is thus imperative that the attorney use every permissible 
means to convince the defendant that the defense should present 
mitigating evidence at the penalty trial. 
C. The Attorney's Obligation to Investigate in Preparation for the 
Penalty Trial 
From the capital-defense attorney's perspective, convincing the 
defendant that the defense needs to investigate for the purpose of 
presenting mitigating evidence at the penalty trial is important 
because it will facilitate the investigation.158 Even if the defendant does 
not agree that the defense should introduce mitigating evidence at a 
possible penalty trial, however, the attorney should nevertheless insist 
that an investigator compile a complete social history of the 
defendant. From the attorney's perspective, the social history is 
indispensable for two reasons: first, as Michael Burt explained,159 it 
may uncover evidence relevant to the guilt trial; second, the attorney 
needs the fruits of the investigation to provide the defendant with 
information that will enable him to make an informed choice with 
respect to his options at the penalty trial. 
As previously indicated,160 a capital defendant with a strong claim 
of innocence may be unable to focus on the penalty trial prior to the 
guilt trial. In order to ensure that the defendant makes an informed 
decision as to the strategy to be adopted at the penalty trial, the 
defense attorney will thus sometimes have to postpone the final 
discussion of this issue until the defendant has been convicted of the 
capital offense. In order to make the defendant fully aware of his 
options at that time, however, the attorney must be aware of the 
157. Bright Interview, supra note 128. 
158. In addition to providing information relating to his own background, the defendant 
may be able to identify witnesses or significant aspects of his life that will be valuable to the 
investigator compiling the defendant's social history. 
159. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
160. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text. 
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nature of any potential mitigating evidence so that she will be able to 
explain to the defendant the value of introducing that evidence at the 
penalty trial.161 
When a capital defendant has no objection to presenting mitigating 
evidence at the penalty trial, the defense attorney's obligation to 
investigate will generally be clear. As the Court observed in Wiggins, 
the A BA Guidelines have long provided that a capital-defense 
counsel's investigation should "comprise efforts to discover all 
reasonably available mitigating evidence."162 Neither the ABA 
Guidelines nor any other source suggests that a capital-defense 
attorney's obligation to investigate mitigating evidence varies 
depending on the strength of the capital defendant's defense at the 
guilt trial. 
Is there any basis for concluding that an attorney's obligation to 
investigate should vary depending on this factor? Since every lawyer 
knows that defenses that appear rock solid before trial sometimes may 
be eviscerated in court, a capital-defense attorney surely cannot rely 
on the fact that the capital defendant's claim of innocence will be so 
strong as to negate the possibility of a penalty trial. 
Some defense attorneys may believe, however, that in certain types 
of cases there is no need to investigate mitigating evidence because, 
even if the defendant is convicted of the capital offense, the proper 
strategy at the penalty trial will be to rely entirely on persuading the 
jury that they should not sentence the defendant to death because of 
their lingering doubt as to his guilt. When the government's case is 
based on weak circumstantial evidence, for example, the defense 
attorney may assert: first, if the defendant is convicted, a lingering­
doubt argument should be made to the penalty jury; and, second, since 
161. The latest ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in 
Death Penalty Cases clarify the nature of the capital-defense attorney's obligation. They first 
explain the nature of the problems presented. Some defendants "initially insist they want to 
be executed - as punishment for their crimes or because they believe they would rather die 
than spend the rest of their lives in prison." ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND 
PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES Guideline 10.5 cmt. (2003) 
[hereinafter 2003 GUIDELINES]. Others "want to contest their guilt but not present 
mitigation." Id. Counsel, however, cannot "simply acquiesce" to these desires because they 
usually reflect "overwhelming feelings of guilt or despair rather than a rational decision." Id. 
Thus, according to the new ABA Guidelines, "(t]he investigation regarding guilt should be 
conducted regardless of any admission or statement by the client that evidence bearing upon 
guilt is not to be collected or presented." Id. Guideline 10.7(A)(l) (emphasis added). The 
same holds true for the penalty phase. Id. Guideline 10.7(A)(2). Counsel may not simply 
advise her client of the possible trial or penalty alternatives and then follow the client's 
directives as to which ones he or she wants to pursue. An investigation must be conducted. 
Id. Guideline 10.7 cmt. Without a "thorough investigation with respect to both phases of the 
case," counsel cannot reasonably advise her client "about the merits of different courses of 
action, the client cannot make informed decisions, and counsel cannot be sure of the client's 
competency to make such decisions." Id. Guideline 10.7 cmt. 
162. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524. 
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a jury's lingering doubt as to the defendant's guilt is the factor that is 
most likely to lead the jury to spare the defendant's life,163 the attorney 
should not dilute the force of the lingering-doubt argument by 
introducing mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's 
background. In order to assess this claim's validity, it is necessary to 
consider under what circumstances the strategy of relying solely on a 
claim of lingering doubt at the penalty trial is reasonable. 
III. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S STRATEGY AT THE PENALTY TRIAL 
A. The Effect of the Defendant's Claim of Innocence at the Guilt Trial 
When a capital defendant who presented a claim of innocence at 
the guilt trial is convicted of the capital offense, the defendant's 
attorney will often need to consider whether she should continue to 
assert the defendant's claim of innocence at the penalty trial. Even 
though the jury rejected this claim at the guilt stage, the attorney may 
believe that she should continue to assert this claim, arguing that 
jurors should vote to spare the defendant's life if they have any 
residual or lingering doubt as to the defendant's guilt. If the attorney 
does decide to argue that the jury should spare the defendant's life 
because of lingering doubts as to his guilt, she may have to make other 
difficult decisions, including how she should present the lingering­
doubt claim and what other evidence and arguments will be 
compatible with that claim. 
When the defense attorney believes that the claim of innocence 
presented at the guilt trial was strong, she may firmly believe that she 
should continue to press this claim at the penalty trial. When the jury 
in a capital case does have a lingering doubt as to the defendant's 
guilt, it seems clear that it will view such a doubt as one of the 
strongest possible reasons for sparing the defendant's life.164 If the 
defense attorney has asserted a claim of innocence that seemed strong 
to her, she may naturally believe that at least one of the jurors will be 
sufficiently persuaded by that evidence to have a lingering doubt as to 
the defendant's guilt, and, in some jurisdictions, even one such juror 
may be enough to avoid a possible death sentence.165 In capital cases 
163. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
164. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
165. Under most sentencing statutes, the jury must unanimously agree to impose the 
death sentence. See, e.g. , 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (c)(iv)-(v) (West Supp. 2004) 
(stating a capital jury must unanimously decide to impose a death sentence, otherwise the 
judge will end the jury's deliberations and sentence the defendant to life imprisonment); 18  
U.S.C. § 3593(d) (2000) (stating the jury must unanimously find aggravating factors and if 
they cannot do so, the court "shall impose a sentence other than death"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
21, § 701 .1 1  (2002) (requiring a "unanimous recommendation of death" and if the jury 
cannot agree to a sentence, the sentence must be "imprisonment for life without parole or 
imprisonment for life"). 
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where a strong claim of innocence was presented at the guilt trial, 
some defense attorneys will thus believe that the best penalty-trial 
strategy is to argue that the jury should not impose the death penalty 
because of their lingering doubt as to the defendant's guilt. In some of 
these cases, moreover, these attorneys apparently believe that the 
argument relating to lingering doubt is the only argument that needs 
to be presented at the penalty trial.166 Instead of also presenting other 
mitigating evidence that might give the jury additional reasons for 
sparing the defendant's life, they rely solely on the argument that the 
jury's lingering doubt as to the defendant's guilt should lead it to 
impose a life sentence.167 
The experienced capital-defense attorneys with whom I spoke, 
however, uniformly reject a strategy that places undue emphasis on 
convincing the jury that has just convicted a defendant that there is a 
lingering doubt as to that defendant's guilt. As I have already 
indicated, 168 jurors on a death-qualified jury are likely to evaluate 
evidence in a way that is strongly favorable to the prosecution. These 
jurors are thus significantly less likely than the normal population to 
perceive a lingering doubt, or any kind of doubt, as to a criminal 
defendant's guilt. In addition, members of any jury may believe that 
once the jury has returned a guilty verdict, that verdict resolves all 
possible doubts against the defendant.169 Indeed, they may feel that a 
defense attorney's argument that there is still a lingering doubt as to 
guilt is disrespectful to the jury in the sense that it challenges the 
legitimacy of their recently returned verdict. 170 
Additionally, empirical data indicate that one of the factors that is 
most likely to lead jurors to spare a capital defendant's life is their 
166. In several cases, lower courts have held that a capital defendant's attorney made a 
reasonable choice to rely primarily or exclusively on the strategy of arguing "residual" or 
"lingering" doubt at the defendant's penalty trial. See, e.g., Chandler v. United States, 218 
F.3d 1305, 1320 ( 11th Cir. 2000); Tarver v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 710, 715-16 ( 11th Cir. 1999). 
167. See, e.g. , Parker v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corrs., 331 F.3d 764, 787-88 (11th Cir. 
2003) (trial counsel argued residual doubt following defendant's conviction and did not 
present much mitigating evidence out of concern that it would do more harm than good), 
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1513 (2004); Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(en bane) (trial counsel presented a strong claim of innocence at the guilt trial and primarily 
a residual doubt claim at the penalty trial); Tarver v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 710, 716 (11th Cir. 
1999) (same). 
168. See supra notes 133-136 and accompanying text. 
169. See Sundby, supra note 52, at 1576-80 (describing how after returning a guilty 
verdict, penalty jurors frequently fail to perceive a difference between reasonable and 
residual doubt; rather, they view their verdict as foreclosing any doubt as to the defendant's 
guilt). , 
170. Id. at 1578 (telling how some jurors feel insulted at the suggestion that they should 
have lingering doubts; these jurors fervently believe that they "would not have convicted the 
defendant in the first place had any such doubt existed"). 
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perception that the defendant is remorseful.171 When the defense has 
asserted that the defendant is innocent during the guilt trial, the 
defendant cannot credibly express remorse for committing the crime 
at the penalty trial. If the defense argues lingering doubt at the penalty 
trial, however, the jury may view this argument as the strongest 
possible indication of the defendant's lack of remorse. If the defense 
insists that there is still a doubt as to whether the defendant 
committed the crime, then clearly the defendant not only lacks 
remorse for his crime, but is not even willing to take the first step 
toward accepting responsibility for committing it.172 
Experienced capital-defense attorneys thus conclude that even in 
cases where a strong claim of innocence has been presented at the 
guilt trial, the defense should sometimes make no reference to the 
possibility of lingering doubt at the penalty trial.173 Instead, the 
defense should take the position that the guilt and penalty trials are 
completely separate proceedings. If one attorney represented the 
defendant at the guilt trial, it may be helpful to have a new attorney 
represent him at the penalty trial. That attorney may begin by telling 
the jury that the defense accepts the jury's verdict. She will then 
explain that the case has now entered a new stage in which the jury 
will have to decide whether the defendant will be sentenced to death 
or life in prison and that, in deciding this question, they will need to 
"look at who the defendant is. "174 The attorney will then proceed to 
present mitigating evidence that will explain the defendant's 
background, including his childhood, his mental health, the difficulties 
he has encountered, his accomplishments, and other circumstances, 
including perhaps "the suffering [the defendant's family] will go 
through if [the defendant] is sentenced to death."175 Although the 
attorney may hope that some jurors will refuse to vote for the death 
penalty because they have a lingering doubt as to the defendant's 
guilt, 176 she may decide not to refer to this possibility during the 
171.  John H. Blume et al., Lessons from the Capital Jury Project, in BEYOND REPAIR? 
AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 144, 164-65 (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003) (making the same 
observations as Sundby, supra note 52, at 1578); Sundby, supra note 52, at 1566 (detailing 
interviews in which jurors "frequently articulated . . .  that they likely would have voted for a 
life sentence instead of death had the defendant expressed remorse"). 
172. See Sundby, supra note 52, at 1574 (concluding, based on interviews with jurors, 
that "a defendant's degree of remorse is largely a reflection of whether the defendant is at 
least acknowledging the killing or whether he is refusing to accept any responsibility for the 
killing"). 
173. Bright Interview, supra note 128. 
174. Burt Interview, supra note 132. 
175. Bright email, supra note 107. 
176. According to experienced capital-defense attorneys, juries in capital cases 
sometimes decide during the guilt trial that they will not impose the death sentence. Jurors 
who have some doubt as to the defendant's guilt may agree to vote for a guilty verdict only 
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penalty trial but instead to focus entirely on presenting mitigating 
evidence that will provide the jury with a multilayered picture of the 
defendant. 
As in every capital case, defense attorneys who have presented a 
claim of innocence at the guilt trial will have to make choices as to the 
nature of the mitigating evidence to be presented at the penalty trial. 
In a typical case, the investigation of the defendant's social history will 
yield a wide array of evidence. Some of this evidence could be 
presented at the penalty trial for the purpose of explaining why the 
defendant committed the crime: perhaps his mental problems reduced 
his ability to control his conduct, or the abuse he was subjected to as a 
child made him more prone to respond aggressively to stressful 
situations. 177 
In cases where the defense has presented a strong claim of 
innocence at the guilt stage, experienced capital-defense attorneys 
state that they will be less likely to introduce mitigating evidence 
designed to explain why the defendant committed the crime. Their 
reasoning is that it is essential for the defense to maintain a consistent 
theory throughout the capital trial.178 If the defense has maintained 
throughout the guilt trial that the defendant did not commit the 
offense, introducing evidence at the penalty trial that seems to explain 
why he committed it may lead the jury to view the defense attorney as 
disingenuous. If the defense's penalty-trial evidence provides an 
explanation for why the defendant is likely to respond to a stressful 
situation with violence, for example, the jury may feel that defense 
counsel should have presented this evidence at the guilt stage rather 
than asserting a claim of innocence without providing information that 
would have helped the jury assess that claim. 
When it is possible, the defense will thus try to present only 
mitigating evidence at the penalty trial that is consistent with the 
defendant's claim of innocence at the guilt trial. Such evidence, which 
attorneys refer to as "good-guy" evidence, may include evidence 
relating to the defendant's good character, his good employment 
record, or as in the Chandler case, the help he has provided to others 
in various situations.179 Even if strong evidence of this type is not 
available, the defense might at least be able to present testimony that 
on the condition that the jury will not impose the death sentence. Bright Interview, supra 
note 128; Bruck Interview, supra note 125. 
177. See White, supra note 53, at 360-65. 
178. See Andrea D. Lyon, Defending the Death Penalty: What Makes Death Different?, 
42 MERCER L. REV. 695, 708 (1991). 
179. In some cases, capital-defense attorneys will be able to introduce evidence relating 
to the defendant's positive contributions in prison. In one case, the defendant's mitigating 
evidence related to the fact that he had defused a dangerous situation in prison, thereby 
probably saving another prisoner's life. Jaffe Interview, supra note 127. 
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the defendant is a nonaggressive individual who does not have a prior 
history of violent behavior. 
If significant good-guy evidence is introduced, it will dovetail with 
the claim of innocence asserted at the guilt trial. Through presenting 
this evidence, the defense attorney hopes to revive any doubts that 
members of the jury may have had as to the defendant's guilt. In the 
course of explaining who the defendant is, the defense attorney hopes 
to reinforce the idea that the defendant is not the kind of person who 
would have committed this crime. Some experienced capital-defense 
attorneys can recall cases in which, after they had presented strong 
good-guy mitigating evidence, the penalty jury not only declined to 
impose the death penalty but asked if they could change the guilty 
verdict they rendered at the guilt stage,180 a possibility that is 
foreclosed by the rule that the jury cannot change its verdict after it 
has been accepted by the court.181 
Unfortunately, in some cases in which the defendant has 
maintained his innocence during the guilt trial, good-guy evidence that 
could buttress this claim at the penalty trial will be noticeably lacking. 
The only potential mitigating evidence will be witnesses who may be 
able to provide a sympathetic portrait of the defendant but can do so 
only by testifying to his problems, which may include, for example, 
"severe mental impairment perhaps resulting from organic brain 
damage and a profoundly troubled childhood in which the defendant 
was subjected to horrendous abuse and profound neglect."182 Evidence 
of this type is double-edged in the sense that, while it does explain 
where the defendant has come from and how he got to be the way he 
is, it also has the potential to not only eliminate any lingering doubts 
jurors might have had as to the defendant's guilt, but also to 
strengthen their perception that sparing his life will enhance the 
danger to society, a consideration that empirical data indicate will 
weigh heavily in the penalty jury's decision.183 
180. Charlton Interview, supra note 135; Niland Interview, supra note 149. 
181. In determining the scope of a jury's authority to change its verdict in a capital case, 
courts have invariably concluded that "the authority of a jury to amend or correct a criminal 
verdict terminates with the beginning of the next phase of the proceeding." See David J. 
Marchitelli, Annotation, Criminal Law: Propriety of Reassembling Jury to A mend, Correct, 
Clarify, or Otherwise Change Verdict After Jury Has Been Discharged, or Has Reached or 
Sealed Its Verdict and Separated, 14 A.LR. 5th 89, 172 (1993). 
182. Charlton Interview, supra note 135. According to Stephen Bright, it is not at all 
unusual for a capital defendant to have this kind of background. Bright Interview, supra note 
128. 
183. Results from the Capital Jury Project show that jurors "who believed the defendant 
would be a future danger [were] more likely to vote for death . . .  than [those] who believed 
otherwise." Blume et al., supra note 171, at 165. Such jurors fear that "unless the defendant 
is executed he will be released from the secure confines of prison too soon." Id. at 176. 
Death, they believe, is "the only real way to guarantee the defendant's incapacitation." Id. 
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The choice of whether to present double-edged mitigating 
evidence or to present little or no mitigating evidence might seem to 
present a dilemma for a capital-defense attorney. When confronted 
with this choice, however, experienced capital-defense attorneys 
invariably conclude that mitigating evidence must be presented, even 
if there is some chance that the jury may view it as double-edged. 
Stephen Bright states that in a capital case, defense counsel should 
always present mitigating evidence that will explain the defendant's 
background and history to the jury, thereby enabling the jury to gain 
an understanding of the defendant as a person.184 As another 
experienced attorney explains, "You have to put the jury in the 
defendant's neighborhood" so that the jurors will be able to 
"understand where he's been" and "what it was like growing up in the 
way he did. "185 
If no mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's background is 
presented, the jurors are likely to feel they "have no reason to spare 
the defendant's life."186 On the other hand, even double-edged 
mitigating evidence can be used to present a powerful case for life by 
causing the jury to empathize with the defendant. According to John 
Niland, an experienced Texas capital-defense attorney, if the evidence 
is effectively presented, the jurors may end up at least feeling that they 
have some understanding of the difficulties the defendant has 
experienced, in which case they will be less inclined to impose the 
death penalty.187 In nearly all capital cases, experienced capital­
defense attorneys thus opt to introduce double-edged mitigating 
evidence when introducing such evidence is the only means of 
explaining the defendant's life.188 
184. Bright Interview, supra note 128. 
185. Charlton Interview, supra note 135. 
186. Bright Interview, supra note 128. 
187. Niland Interview, supra note 149. 
188. Defense counsel may also be able to take measures to neutralize the adverse effects 
of potentially double-edged mitigating evidence. When dealing with mitigating evidence that 
is double-edged because it suggests that the defendant is the kind of person who would be 
likely to have committed the crime - the defendant's violent or troubled background, for 
example - defense counsel can sometimes argue that this evidence provides an explanation 
for why the police might mistakenly suspect the defendant of the crime. Niland Interview, 
supra note 149. If the mitigating evidence is double-edged because it suggests that the 
defendant may pose a future danger to society, moreover, defense counsel may be able to 
neutralize this evidence by introducing evidence that shows the defendant will not pose any 
danger to society if he is incarcerated for life. Evidence relating to the defendant's prior 
good conduct in prisons or other institutions, for example, may show that the defendant is 
dangerous only when he is in an unstructured environment. If he is sentenced to life in 
prison, he will not be a threat to anyone. In some cases, however, the extent to which 
defense counsel can neutralize the effect of double-edged mitigating evidence may be 
limited. 
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B. Arguing Lingering Doubt at the Penalty Trial 
2037 
Even though arguing lingering doubt to the penalty jury is often 
risky, experienced capital-defense attorneys believe there are 
situations in which such arguments should be made. In deciding 
whether to argue lingering doubt, these attorneys will consider various 
factors, including the length of the jury's deliberations, the strength 
and nature of both the government's and the defendant's case, the 
nature of the defense's possible penalty-trial evidence, and the law of 
the jurisdiction relating to whether evidence or argument relating to 
lingering doubt may be introduced. In most cases, these same factors 
will also play an important part in determining the content of the 
attorney's lingering-doubt argument, the extent to which the attorney 
will introduce other mitigating evidence, and the ways in which the 
attorney will interweave the arguments relating to lingering doubt 
with those relating to the other evidence. In order to illustrate 
experienced capital-defense attorney's strategies, I will provide 
examples of several lingering-doubt arguments, and then a fuller 
description of two penalty arguments, which illustrate the context in 
which lingering-doubt arguments are presented and the methods 
through which skilled capital-defense attorneys interweave these 
arguments with those based on different types of mitigating evidence. 
1 .  Examples of Lingering-Doubt Arguments 
In some cases, an experienced capital-defense attorney will decide 
to argue lingering doubt only if the jury's lengthy deliberations at the 
guilt stage signal that at least some of the jurors have doubts as to the 
defendant's guilt.189 When the jury's deliberations indicate the 
possibility of such doubts, the defense attorney will advert to the jury's 
deliberations in her closing argument, explaining to the jurors that, if 
any of them had doubts as to the defendant's guilt for the capital 
offense, this provides a reason why they should vote against the death 
penalty. 
This kind of argument can be effective even if the issue that 
precipitated lengthy jury deliberation related to the defendant's 
degree of guilt rather than his total innocence. For example, in a case 
involving William Brooks, a young African American charged with 
robbing, raping, and intentionally shooting to death a young white 
woman, Brooks's attorney, Stephen Bright, did not dispute that 
Brooks had robbed, raped, and shot the young woman, causing her 
death. The defense did maintain, however, that the shooting was 
accidental rather than intentional. At the guilt trial, the jury 
189. Bright Interview, supra note 128. 
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adjudicated Brooks guilty of capital murder, but only after engaging in 
lengthy deliberations relating to the question of whether the shooting 
was intentional or accidental.190 
In his penalty-trial argument, Bright referred to the jury's lengthy 
deliberations as a reason why the death penalty should not be 
imposed: 
And we told you about the circumstances of the gun going off and you 
spent a day agonizing over that and I'm sure discussing it back and forth 
and you came to the decision you came to. But I'd suggest to you, ladies 
and gentlemen, that part of that struggle is a reason for voting for a life 
sentence in this case, the fact that it was a close question, a difficult 
question, a question that obviously some of you had different views 
about before you came to an ultimate agreement on it. But if there's 
some lingering question among any of you as to exactly what happened 
when all those events were going on out there, that's a reason to consider 
life and vote for life because that goes to the degree of culpability and 
blameworthiness in this case.191 
Bright's argument was obviously directed to the members of the jury 
who had earlier had difficulty in concluding that the defendant had 
intentionally shot the victim. While not criticizing those jurors' 
decision to join with the majority in returning a verdict of guilty of 
capital murder, Bright's argument emphasized that each juror should 
reconsider whether she had any lingering doubt as to the defendant's 
guilt and, if she had such a doubt, to use it as a basis for declining to 
vote for the death sentence. 
When the government's case has obvious weaknesses - a key 
government witness has been shown to be unreliable, for example -
the defense attorney may decide to make a lingering-doubt argument 
in a way that exploits this weakness. In making this argument, the 
attorney will generally be careful to avoid any express or implied 
criticism of the jury's verdict. David Bruck observes that, in such 
cases, he will sometimes begin his argument relating to lingering doubt 
by telling the jury that, based on the evidence they had to work with 
and the standard of proof they were required to apply, their verdict 
was at least reasonable.192 After thus making it clear that he respects 
the jury's verdict, Bruck will then explain that the jury should adopt a 
different perspective in deciding whether the evidence is strong 
enough to warrant a death sentence. 
Bruck's lingering-doubt argument on behalf of Paul Mazzell 
provides an apt example. At Mazzell's guilt trial, the chief government 
190. Case Example: Presenting a Theme Throughout the Case, S. CTR. FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS 9 (stating jury in Brooks case deliberated for a day before returning a "verdict of 
guilty of malice murder"). 
191. Id. at 23. 
192. Bruck Interview, supra note 125. 
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witness was Danny Hogg, who testified under a grant of immunity that 
he and another man obeyed Mazzell's orders to bring the victim to 
Mazzell and that Mazzell alone killed the victim. Hogg's testimony 
was impeached by his past criminal record, his own admission that he 
had given false testimony at an earlier trial, and his admission that his 
grant of immunity would be revoked if the government concluded that 
he himself had killed the victim.193 Three witnesses testified that Hogg 
had in fact killed the victim and the prosecutor acknowledged to the 
jury that Hogg was not a believable witness. 194 The jury nevertheless 
convicted Mazzell of capital murder. 
At the penalty trial, Bruck began his lingering-doubt argument as 
follows: 
I want to preface this by saying again that what I'm about to say is not to 
quarrel with your verdict or say you made a mistake. You took the 
evidence as it existed in the courtroom during the past week or two; and 
you, consistent with your oath, applied your good j udgment to that 
evidence, and you found beyond a reasonable doubt that Paul was guilty. 
And I'm not going to quarrel with that in any way, shape or form. 
Bruck then moved to the question of how the jury should approach 
the evidence in deciding the question before it at the penalty stage: 
The evidence presented to you, as it had been pulled together by the 
State over the last week or two, was guilty; but before you can put this 
man to death based on that evidence you have to be sure of a fourth 
thing beyond a reasonable doubt, and that is that the evidence that was 
given to you and that you had to make do with as it had been pulled 
together and hammered into shape by the time you had to deliberate, 
that that evidence will never, never change. And you have to be sure of 
that beyond a reasonable doubt. Y'all know exactly what I'm talking 
about. 
You have to be sure beyond a .reasonable doubt that Mr. Hogg won't 
come up next month, next week, ten years from now, long after Paul has 
been executed and buried and, for whatever reasons of his own, his 
interests having changed, he's not going to come along and say: "Well, 
I'm kind of embarrassed to say this now, but I didn't tell the truth at the 
trial." You have to be sure of that because, if Paul was still doing his life 
sentence in prison and Mr. Hogg happened to say that, something can be 
done about it; but if he's executed, it can't. 195 
Michael Burt asserts that the argument that evidence of the 
defendant's guilt "may change" has more resonance today than it did 
in the past because of jurors' awareness of cases in which convicted 
defendants have been exonerated. In order to draw on this awareness, 
193. State v. Merriman, 337 S.E.2d 218, 227 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985). 
194. Id. 
195. Record at 1993, State v. Merriman, 337 S.E.2d 218, 227 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) (No. 
0444) [hereinafter Merriman Record]. 
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a capital-defense attorney may begin by telling the jury that she 
respects its verdict, but in reaching the judgment that an individual is 
guilty of a crime "we are dealing with human institutions that we know 
are fallible. "196 The attorney may then refer to cases in which 
defendants convicted of crimes were later exonerated and state that in 
those cases the government's evidence seemed to establish the 
defendants' guilt and the juries that convicted those defendants were 
convinced that their verdicts were correct.197 
In some cases, the attorney will seek to draw even closer parallels 
between the present case and prior wrongful convictions. When the 
prosecution's case has obvious weaknesses, Bruck will tell the jury that 
in cases in which convicted defendants were later exonerated there 
were "always warning signs."198 He will then explain some of the types 
of evidence that constitute warning signs - government witnesses 
who change their stories, for example, or disputed forensic evidence 
- and show that those same warning signs are present in the case 
before them.199 
In arguing lingering doubt to the penalty jury, an experienced 
capital-defense attorney will often assert that the jury should not 
impose the death penalty unless they find that the government's 
evidence meets a higher standard of proof than the "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard that governed their deliberations at the 
guilt stage. Michael Burt states that in California, a capital defendant's 
attorney will sometimes begin orienting jurors as to the differing 
standards of proof at the voir dire stage.200 The attorney may even use 
one or more diagrams to illustrate the different standards of proof 
required at different stages of the proceedings, including, perhaps, 
reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant, probable cause to arrest 
him, proof beyond a reasonable doubt to convict him of the capital 
offense, and proof beyond any doubt to sentence him to death.201 
After the defendant has been convicted of the capital offense, the 
attorney at the penalty trial will then refer to the earlier schematic 
presentation and remind the jury that they should not impose the 
death penalty unless the evidence of guilt meets the most stringent 
standard. In some California cases, this argument will be especially 
effective because the trial judge's lingering-doubt instructions will 
reinforce the attorney's argument that the prosecution's evidence of 
196. Burt Interview, supra note 132. 
197. Bruck Interview, supra note 125; Burt Interview, supra note 132. 
198. Bruck Interview, supra note 125. 
199. Id. 
200. Burt Interview, supra note 132. 
201. Id. 
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guilt should be required to meet a higher standard of proof at the 
penalty stage.202 
Even when they expect no help from the judge's instructions,203 
however, experienced capital-defense attorneys will still sometimes 
argue that the jury should apply a higher standard of proof before 
imposing a death sentence. Even if the judge sustains a prosecutor's 
objection to this argument, the defense may still benefit. The objection 
will call the jury's attention to the issue of lingering doubt and perhaps 
signal to them that the prosecutor does not believe that his case has 
been proved beyond any doubt. The prosecutor's objection, moreover, 
may give the defense attorney an opportunity to reinforce to the jury 
the message that it has the ultimate responsibility for deciding whether 
the death penalty should be imposed. 
202. See, e.g. , People v. Cox, 809 P.2d 351, 386 (Cal. 1990) (holding that a jury 
instruction on lingering doubt may be required by statute if warranted by the evidence). But 
see People v. Medina, 906 P.2d 2, 29 (Cal. 1995) (holding that jury may consider lingering 
doubts in penalty phase, but there is no federal or state constitutional right to a jury 
instruction). In some California cases, judges have instructed the penalty jury as follows: 
Although proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has been found, you may demand a 
greater degree of certainty for the imposition of the death penalty. The adjudication of guilt 
is not infallible and any lingering doubt you entertain on the question of guilt may be 
considered by you in determining the appropriate penalty, including the possibility that at 
some time in the future, facts may come to light that have not yet been discovered. 
People v. Snow, 65 P.3d 749, 799 (Cal. 2003). 
Alternatively, counsel may request a special separate instruction, such as the following 
instruction requested in the case of People v. Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. 837, 839 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1990): 
Each individual juror may consider as a mitigating factor residual or lingering doubt as to 
whether defendant intentionally killed the victim. Lingering or residual doubt is defined as 
the state of mind between beyond a reasonable doubt and beyond all possible doubts. 
Thus if any individual juror has a lingering or residual doubt about whether the defendant 
intentionally killed the victim, he or she must consider this as a mitigating factor and assign 
to it the weight you deem appropriate. 
Email from Michael Burt (Mar. 26, 2003) (hereinafter Burt email] (source on file with 
author). 
203. In most jurisdictions, the judge will not instruct the penalty jury that its lingering 
doubt as to the defendant's guilt may be considered as a mitigating circumstance. See 
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1988); Overstreet v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1 140, 1 163 
(Ind. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1146 (2004); State v. Josephs, 803 A.2d 1074, 1116 (N.J. 
2002); Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 38 (Ky. 1998); Holland v. State, 705 So. 2d 
307, 326 (Miss. 1997); Evans v. State, 926 P.2d 265, 284 (Nev. 1996); State v. Gamer, 656 
N.E.2d 623, 632 (Ohio 1995); State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 813 (Tenn. 1994); State v. 
Rogers, 836 P.2d 1308, 1328 (Or. 1992); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 196, 211 
(Va. 1991); Ruiz v.  State, 772 S.W.2d 297 (Ark. 1989); Melson v. State, 775 So. 2d 857, 898 
(Ala. Crim. App. 1999), affd, 775 So. 2d 904 (2000); Bemay v. State, 989 P.2d 998, 1012 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1999). Courts that have considered the question have generally held (or 
stated in dicta) that a capital defendant is not entitled to have the judge charge the penalty 
jury that its lingering doubt as to the defendant's guilt may be considered as mitigating 
evidence. See Franklin, 487 U.S. at 174 (dicta); Holland v. State, 705 So. 2d 307, 354 (Miss. 
1997); People v. Harris, 676 N.Y.S.2d 440, 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998); State v. Fletcher, 555 
S.E.2d 534, 544 (N.C. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 846 (2002); State v. McGuire, 686 N.E.2d 
1 1 12, 1 122-23 (Ohio 1997). 
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In the Mazze[ case, for example, after pointing out to the jury that 
it was possible that the chief government witness might later change 
his story,204 Bruck added that he didn't know whether that would 
happen. He next addressed the level of proof the jury should require 
to sentence the defendant to death and the prosecutor objected: 
Mr. Bruck: But before you put a man to death on their 
testimony, you have to be sure beyond all doubt 
that it will never happen. And that's ridiculous. 
Who can be sure of that beyond all doubt? 
Mr. Stoney:Your honor, I object. The law is not all doubt. It's 
a reasonable doubt, you Honor. 
The Court: Reasonable doubt, Mr. Bruck. 
Mr. Bruck: Yes, sir. The amount of doubt that you feel you're 
willing to tolerate before you put a man to death, of 
course, is between you and your own conscience. 
And I won't go into that anymore.205 
Bruck, however, did further refer to the subject of the standard of 
proof. After talking about mistakes that have been made in the court 
system, he emphatically stated, "The death penalty is for cases where 
there can't have been any kind of mistake, and this is just not such a 
case."206 After explaining why Mazzell's case was not one in which 
there could not have been a mistake, Bruck adverted to the 
prosecutor's earlier objection, using it to emphasize the jury's 
responsibility for determining whether a death sentence should be 
imposed: 
Mr. Stoney jumps up and objects and says: "Well, its not beyond all 
doubt. Its just beyond a reasonable doubt." Well, that's fine for him to 
say, and that's fine for the law to say; but the responsibility for whether 
Paul Mazzell lives or dies is not on Mr. Stoney. It's not even on Judge 
Fields. It's on each individual one of you.207 
Through this argument, Bruck effectively communicated to the jury 
the reasons why it would be appropriate for them to decline to impose 
the death penalty unless the prosecutor established the defendant's 
guilt beyond any doubt. 
2. Two Penalty-Trial Arguments 
Excerpts from two penalty-trial arguments provide a fuller picture 
of the strategic choices skilled defense attorneys make when 
204. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
205. Merriman Record, supra note 195, at 1993-94 (emphasis added). 
206. Id. at 1995. 
207. Id. at 1996. 
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presenting a lingering-doubt argument. In particular, the arguments in 
these two cases - one from California and one from New York -
illustrate the ways in which different attorneys direct the jury's 
attention to the issue of lingering doubt, interweave arguments 
relating to lingering doubt with arguments based on mitigating 
evidence, and highlight the importance of humanizing the defendant 
so that the jury will have a reason to spare his life. 
The Henderson Case 
Philip Henderson was convicted of capital murder in California, a 
state that allows the consideration of lingering doubt as a mitigating 
factor.208 Henderson, represented by Michael Burt and James Pagano, 
was charged with four counts of first-degree murder and one count of 
auto theft.209 Ray and Anita Boggs, their one-year-old child, Ray, Jr., 
and Anita Boggs's unborn fetus210 were found dead on or about 
February 28, 1982, in the area underneath their apartment (which was 
on stilts) and in the backyard of the apartment building. Ray had been 
shot to death and Anita had been strangled.211 The Boggs family had 
been killed about six weeks earlier, during the second week of January 
1982, and items belonging to them had been taken from their 
apartment at the time of their death.212 
The police investigating the case determined that Philip 
Henderson and his wife, Velma, had stayed at the Boggs's apartment 
in January 1982. When contacted by the police, Henderson told them 
he and his wife had last seen the Boggses on January 11 ,  the day on 
which the Hendersons left San Francisco to go to Florida. Henderson 
did not tell the police that he had taken Boggs's property or that he 
had noticed anything unusual in the apartment before he and his wife 
left for Florida. 
The police then discovered that Henderson and his wife had sold 
property that belonged to Ray Boggs during their trip to Florida.213 In 
addition, witnesses noticed that Henderson had in his possession a .22 
caliber long rifle similar to a rifle belonging to Boggs.214 A criminalist 
testified that the bullet retrieved from Ray Boggs's brain was fired 
208. See text accompanying note 241 infra. 
209. People v. Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. 837, 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
210. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (Deering 2003) (making the premeditated killing 
of either a living person or an unborn fetus first-degree murder). 
211. Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 840-41 .  
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 842. 
214. Id. at 842-43. One of these witnesses also testified that Henderson told him that he 
and his wife were "on the run." Id. at 843. 
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from a .22 caliber long rifle. While the expert could not positively 
identify the rifle possessed by Henderson as the one that had fired the 
bullet, he testified that the identifying characteristics of a bullet fired 
from that gun were "consistent with the characteristics found on the 
bullet which killed Ray Boggs. "215 
Henderson testified in his own defense. He denied the murders but 
admitted that he and his wife stole Boggs's property on January 11 .  He 
testified that Boggs was involved in selling drugs and that on one 
occasion he had been threatened by two men, including one called 
"Hawaiian Jimmy," who beat Boggs on the head with a cane. He 
testified that he and his wife decided to leave for Florida because they 
were frightened by Boggs's drug business and the violence that 
accompanied it. 
Henderson claimed that on January 11  he and his wife had helped 
Ray Boggs look for Boggs's wife, who was missing. When they 
returned to the Boggs's apartment that evening, the apartment was in 
disarray and Ray Boggs's rifle was off the rack and leaning against the 
wall. The Hendersons became frightened by the circumstances and 
decided this would be a good time to leave. Because they had little 
money, "they decided to steal the Boggses' property."216 Among other 
things, they took Ray's rifle and truck. Later, Henderson sold some of 
the stolen property. He admitted that he had initially lied to the police 
about his activities because he did not want to be prosecuted for 
stealing Boggs's property. 
In order to rebut the defense's suggestion that people associated 
with Boggs in selling drugs might have murdered him, Edward Ramos, 
also known as "Hawaiian Jimmy," testified for the prosecution on 
rebuttal. Ramos admitted threatening Boggs with physical injury 
because Boggs owed him money for work he had done on Boggs's 
truck; but he claimed that he never hit Boggs and that Boggs had paid 
him at least part of the money he owed by giving him a $50 check on 
January 7, 1982.217 
After five or six days of deliberations, the jury found Henderson 
guilty of two counts of capital murder and several lesser crimes. 
Because the defense had presented a strong claim of innocence at the 
guilt trial, Henderson's attorneys decided to present evidence and 
argument relating to lingering doubt at the penalty trial. 
During the penalty trial, the defense introduced evidence relating 
to the defendant's innocence that had not been admitted and would 
not have been admissible during the guilt trial. Most significantly, 
215. Id. 
216. Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 844. 
217. Id. He also testified that "[a] few weeks later" he attempted "to collect the rest of 
the money [Boggs] owed." Id. 
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Rose Marie Hunt testified. She was a close friend of the Boggses and 
the godmother to the Boggses' one-year-old child and she also knew 
the Hendersons as well as other people associated with both families 
during the period when the murders occurred. She opined that Mr. 
Henderson should be given a life sentence because "there's other 
parties involved in this that hasn't been brought forth."218 Asked to 
explain, she broke down in tears and testified from her wheelchair: 
I believe that if he's executed in the gas chamber he may be executed as 
an innocent victim .  And I believe at that time when the true people have 
(been) found out, there will be no way to bring him back to life like there 
is no way to bring my friends back to life. I believe that if he is put to life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole, that if he is guilty, then he's 
punished. If he is not guilty, he has the possibility of coming out and the 
real people being convicted.219 
Other witnesses who knew Henderson also testified that in their 
opinions Henderson was not guilty of the killings that had been 
committed.220 
During his closing argument at the penalty trial, the prosecutor 
specifically addressed the issue of lingering doubt. He first referred to 
the testimony of the witnesses who expressed the opinion that 
Henderson was not guilty. He argued that these witnesses lacked the 
knowledge necessary for an informed opinion. He pointed out that 
some of the witnesses could not assess the defendant's propensities at 
the time of the crime because they had not seen him for many years.221 
In the case of Ms. Hunt, he emphasized that she had not attended the 
guilt trial. He then said: "She didn't listen to the evidence. She didn't 
consider that evidence. That's like someone being a Monday morning 
quarterback who didn't even watch the game the day before. I object 
to that. I think that's real inappropriate."222 
After thus seeking to dismiss the testimony of the defense's 
lingering-doubt witnesses, the prosecutor argued that the jury's verdict 
at the guilt stage should preclude the defense from establishing 
lingering doubt as a mitigating factor: 
Now, if there is a doubt in your mind, I like to think - I like to think that 
you'll resolve that in the guilt phase. And I think you did on certain of 
the offenses. I think you gave the defendant every benefit of every doubt 
that he was ever able to get. . . .  But I submit to you any doubt was 
218. Record at 6955, People v. Henderson, 275 Cal.Rptr. 837 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (Nos. 
A036286 & A036290) [hereinafter Henderson Record). 
219. Id. at 6957. 
220. Burt Interview, supra note 132. 
221. Henderson Record, supra note 218, at 7152 (referring to witnesses basing their 
opinion on "someone they knew ten years ago, 15 years ago, 19 years ago in the case of Mr. 
Comorato [who) knew the defendant when he was ten years old"). 
222 Id. at 7153. 
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resolved in that jury room in the guilt phase. And I'll submit to you that 
it's rather, it's rather a strong word, and I apologize, but it's rather 
insulting to get up here and say may be you were wrong, just may be you 
were a tiny bit. 223 
Consistent with the empirical data relating to capital jurors' 
attitudes,224 the prosecutor's assertion that defense counsel's lingering­
doubt argument was "insulting" seemed designed to lead the jury to 
weigh that argument against the defendant because it represented a 
refusal on the part of the defense to accept the jury's verdict.225 
The prosecutor's primary argument, however, was that the jurors 
should view their verdict at the guilt stage as foreclosing any doubts as 
to the defendant's guilt. After characterizing the lingering-doubt 
argument as insulting, the prosecutor returned to this theme: 
People have to make decisions. If we never made decisions, we would 
never move. Some of you in occupations make decisions, life and death 
decisions on a daily basis. You have to make decisions. You made your 
decision, let's go with it now. If you are going to return a verdict of life 
without possibility of parole, I hope you do it for other than lingering 
doubt. I think that is selling yourself short. That is a cop out.226 
The prosecutor thus continually sought to reinforce the idea that, 
through its verdict at the guilt stage, the jury had resolved all doubts 
against the defendant. 
Defense counsel James Pagano, who had not participated in the 
guilt trial but was the primary attorney during the penalty trial,227 
made the final argument to the penalty jury.228 Early in the argument, 
Pagano referred to the jurors' lengthy deliberations, observing that it 
showed they were "serious about [their] job."229 A little later, he 
specifically responded to the prosecutor's argument relating to 
lingering doubt, emphasizing that a higher standard of proof should be 
required to impose the death penalty: 
And in spite of what counsel said, lingering doubt is very valid here 
especially in the facts and circumstances of this case . . . .  You can find 
somebody guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we explained that to you in 
the voir dire. There is that higher area, just that little bit more. And they 
allow you because this is the death penalty case.230 
223. Id. at 7154. 
224. See supra notes 168-170 and accompanying text. 
225. See supra notes 169-170 and accompanying text. 
226. Henderson Record, supra note 218, at 7154-55. 
227. Burt email, supra note 202. 
228. In California, the defense always has the opportunity to make the final penalty-trial 
argument in a capital case. Id. 
229. Henderson Record, supra note 218, at 7171. 
230. Id. at 7173. 
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Consistent with David Bruck's approach,231 Pagano next asked the jury 
to visualize how the case might look to them in the future: 
And you can say yes, I believe I found this is the guy, that did it beyond a 
reasonable doubt, but would you five years from now, ten years from 
now, 20 years from now, this is the guy that did it, he really did it.232 
Having developed the framework for arguing lingering doubt, 
Pagano proceeded to argue that specific aspects of the case "cried 
[out] for lingering doubt."233 He argued, for example, that the jury 
should give weight to Rose Marie Hunt's opinion: " [N]obody knows 
the cast of characters that hung out at 753 Webster Street or that other 
milieu down at Jack In The Box better than Rose Marie Hunt. And 
the child's godmother is telling you you may have the wrong person 
here, better give it some attention."234 He also argued that, in view of 
the circumstantial nature of the government's case, the jury should 
give weight to the witnesses who testified as to Henderson's 
nonviolent character: "There is no smoking gun here . . . it is 
circumstantial evidence. Mr. Henderson was on trial. It was 
reasonable for you to conclude, perhaps, what you did. But now in the 
penalty phase you've got to know a little bit more about Phil 
Henderson. "235 
During the rest of his argument, Pagano talked primarily about the 
defense witnesses who had testified on Henderson's behalf at the 
penalty trial. Since this testimony could accurately be characterized as 
good-guy evidence,236 Pagano was able to effectively interweave two 
interrelated arguments: the witnesses' testimony showed that 
Henderson's was "a life worth sparing" and that " [t]here [was] a 
lingering doubt" as to his guilt.237 
During the latter part of his argument, Pagano focused primarily 
on the penalty-trial evidence relating to Henderson's background and 
character. He talked about Henderson's life, including the people who 
cared about him, his nonviolent character, and his kindness to 
children.238 Through this argument, Pagano sought to humanize 
Henderson and to convince the jury that his life was worth sparing. 
Pagano also referred to testimony that indicated Henderson would not 
231. See supra notes 192-195 and accompanying text. 
232. Henderson Record, supra note 218, at 7173. 
233. Id. at 7174. 
234. Id. ; Burt Interview, supra note 132. 
235. Henderson Record, supra note 218, at 7177. 
236. See supra notes 179-180 and accompanying text. 
237. Henderson Record, supra note 218, at 7172-85. 
238. Id. at 7186-92. 
2048 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:2001 
be a threat to anyone if he were incarcerated for life.239 He ended by 
urging the jury to accept the alternative of life imprisonment.240 
In accordance with California law, the judge instructed the jury 
that, in deciding whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, 
one of the mitigating factors they could consider was "any lingering 
doubt you may have about his guilt."241 After a relatively short 
deliberation, the jury returned a sentence of life without possibility of 
parole.242 
The Mcintosh Case 
The penalty trial of Dalkeith Mcintosh, who was convicted of 
capital murder in New York, is noteworthy for at least two reasons. 
First, the defense counsel's lingering-doubt argument was unorthodox 
but highly effective, thus demonstrating that skilled capital-defense 
attorneys will adopt different approaches depending on myriad 
circumstances, including the attorney's sense of the rapport she has 
been able to establish with the jury. Second, the case provides a 
striking example of the axiom that, whether or not there is an issue of 
lingering doubt, mitigating evidence explaining the defendant's 
background and history must be presented to the penalty jury. 
Mcintosh was charged with two murders and felonious assault. The 
prosecution claimed that he shot his estranged wife, who was a 
corrections officer, one of her daughters, and her six-year-old 
grandson. The two women died but the six-year-old survived and 
testified against Mcintosh. Mcintosh had previously been charged 
with assault in a domestic incident involving his estranged wife; the 
prosecution's theory was that Mcintosh killed his wife to prevent her 
from testifying against him in the assault case and then shot the others 
because they witnessed him murder his wife.243 Mcintosh also had 
several other prior convictions, including at least one for assault and 
battery and some for marijuana offenses.244 
The shootings took place on a secluded street in a sparsely 
populated area just outside Poughkeepsie, New York. At the time of 
the shooting, the three victims were in a "Volkswagen bug," which was 
stopped in the middle of the street. A motorist driving in the opposite 
direction arrived just as the shooter, a black male, fled into a wooded 
area on the large grounds of a closed state psychiatric hospital. Police 
239. Id. at 7188. 
240. Id. at 7194. 
241. Id. at 7205. 
242. Burt Interview, supra note 132. 
243. Email from Russell Stetler (July 3, 2003) (on file with author). 
244. Stetler Interview, supra note 137. 
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responded quickly. About a half hour later, an officer on the opposite 
side of the hospital grounds saw Mcintosh walking toward town 
through a swamp. When he asked Mcintosh to stop, Mcintosh ran; the 
pursuing officer eventually placed him under arrest. 
The six-year-old witness identified Mcintosh as the shooter. 
Mcintosh's principal trial attorney, William Tendy, argued that this 
child, who had a long history of mental and emotional disorders, was 
highly vulnerable to suggestion and that the circumstances under 
which he identified Mcintosh made the identification unreliable. To 
support the child's identification, the government also presented 
evidence that, more than a year after the crime, an environmental 
clean-up crew clearing the swamp where Mcintosh was seen by the 
police found a no-longer-operable handgun, and an FBI analyst 
testified that the bullet lead in this handgun matched the lead in the 
slugs that killed the victims. Since the swamp had been thoroughly 
searched at the time of Mcintosh's arrest, Tendy vigorously attacked 
the government's effort to establish a connection between Mcintosh 
and the newly discovered murder weapon. At the conclusion of the 
guilt trial, Mcintosh was convicted of four counts of capital murder.245 
At the penalty trial, Tendy made both the opening statement and 
closing argument to the jury. Early in his opening statement, he told 
the jury he was "going to be honest with" them and "do things some 
people told me not to do. "246 He then said, 
I disagree with your verdict. I have to say that. I know I'm not supposed 
to. I know it's not something you want to hear, but it's something I'm 
going to say. I have tried to be as honest with you as I can. I hope you 
respect that. I know you have been honest with us, especially with me, 
and I respect that as well. So I accept the verdict. I have to. I'm no use to 
this man if I don't. I accept it. I understand it, I respect it, but I disagree 
with it.247 
As Tendy indicated, his statement was contrary to the orthodox 
view that the defendant's attorney should not risk antagonizing the 
penalty jury by expressing disagreement with its verdict.248 By 
emphasizing his "respect" for the jury and its verdict, however, Tendy 
245. The jury convicted Mcintosh of intentionally murdering his estranged wife in the 
same transaction in which he intentionally murdered her daughter and vice versa. See N.Y. 
PENAL LAW§ 400.27(3) (Consol. 2003). The jury also convicted Mcintosh of intentionally 
killing his estranged wife's daughter to prevent the daughter from testifying as a witness to 
the murder of his estranged wife and of killing the daughter to prevent her from testifying 
about the attempted murder of the estranged wife's grandson. See id. 
246. Tendy's Opening Statement at 27, People of the State of New York v. Dalkeith 
Mcintosh, State of New York, County Court, Dutchess County, Index #1996/4530 
Superseding Indictment #146/96, Before Hon. George D. Marlow, County Court Judge 
[hereinafter Tendy's Opening Statement]. 
247. Id. at 28. 
248. See supra notes 192-195 and accompanying text. 
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sought to deflect any hostile reaction to his statement. Since he had 
already established a good rapport with the jury, moreover, his 
openness and candor may have had the effect of enhancing rather than 
diminishing the jury's confidence in him. 
After some further comments relating to his disappointment with 
the jury's verdict,249 Tendy stated that the purpose of the penalty trial 
was "to decide if this man lives or dies."250 In explaining how the jury 
should approach this decision, he referred to the fact that a juror's 
lingering doubt could be a basis for voting against the death penalty.251 
He also told the jury that the defense would present witnesses that 
would enable them to "learn a little bit about this man. "252 
Tendy then provided an overview of the defendant's life story and 
alluded to the conflict between himself and the defendant with respect 
to presenting this story to the jury: 
It's a very, very sad story. He doesn't want it told. This man doesn't want 
this story told, he doesn't want to hear it, and I have taken that decision 
away from him. There's some painful memories here . . . .  I think . . .  that 
his punishment really began the day that he was born and will continue 
until the day he dies.253 
During the penalty trial, the defense presented witnesses who 
developed the salient details of Mcintosh's sad story, which included 
an impoverished childhood in Jamaica, horrendous child abuse, and 
the defendant's struggles to overcome severe mental and physical 
problems. 
Some of this evidence was certainly "double-edged" in the sense 
that it might lead the jury to believe that the defendant's prolonged 
exposure to abuse would enhance his propensity toward violence, 
thereby increasing both the jury's confidence in its earlier guilty 
verdict and its sense that, if Mcintosh's life was spared, he might be 
dangerous in the future.254 Nevertheless, the defense presented 
Mcintosh's tragic life story in graphic detail. In his final argument to 
the jury Tendy emphasized some of the most horrendous aspects of 
Mcintosh's history: 
249. At Tendy's request, the judge asked the jury whether the fact that they had 
rejected Tendy's arguments during the guilt stage would affect their ability to listen to his 
arguments at the penalty stage. Tendy's Opening Statement, supra note 246, at 30. In 
addition to explaining his feelings about the jury's verdict, Tendy in his opening statement 
explained to the jury why he had asked this question. Id. 
250. Id. at 31. 
251. Id. at 32. 
252. Id. at 34. 
253. Id. at 35. 
254. Introducing the evidence, moreover, opened up the possibility that the jury would 
learn of Mcintosh's prior convictions, including his prior conviction for assault and battery. 
See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
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This man was born to a mother who never wanted him and a father 
who abandoned him . . . .  All he ever knew was hatred and cruelty. That's 
what he was raised on. He had a stutter so bad that he was afraid to 
speak, and when he did everybody laughed at him, taunted him, and he 
became so afraid that finally he shut down, stopped talking as a child . . . .  
. . . And brutalized . . .  beyond anything that I could ever imagine. 
Whipped until he was cut and bleeding, whipped with sticks soaked in 
salt water so when the cuts were there they would burn from the salt. . . .  
This was a small child. This is mitigation.255 
Later in his argument, Tendy reiterated that he did not "believe[] 
[Mcintosh] committed these crimes."256 Nevertheless, he also made a 
powerful statement explaining why Mcintosh's tragic history should 
be relevant to the jury's sentencing decision. He told the jury that to 
make that decision they needed "to walk in this man's footsteps."257 In 
recounting those footsteps, he focused especially on the significance of 
the brutal child abuse: 
If your mother savagely beat you as a child, took out a whip and whipped 
you with it until your skin bled, until your skin was cut and salt got into 
the wound and made it burn, if she took a board and beat you with it, 
took a pot and hit you with it until your head was bleeding, and she took 
your head and slammed it against walls, and if she took a wooden board 
with a nail in it and beat you while your flesh was being cut telling you 
she wants you dead, tell me where you would all be right now? You want 
to talk about a choice?258 
In this part of the argument, Tendy's point seemed to be that the 
abuse Mcintosh suffered impaired his capacity to govern his conduct, 
thus reducing his culpability for any crimes he may have committed. 
Although this argument - and the vivid description of the abuse that 
supported it - could have had the potential for undercutting Tendy's 
arguments based on lingering doubt, Tendy obviously believed that 
that was a risk worth taking. In order to humanize Mcintosh, Tendy 
presented the full history of Mcintosh's childhood so that the jury 
would be able to see not only the man Dalkeith Mcintosh but "also . . .  
that little boy."259 
In charging the jury, the judge in Mcintosh's case said nothing 
about "lingering doubt" but, in accordance with New York law, told 
them that they could return a life sentence even if they found that the 
255. Tendy's Summation in Penalty Trial at 28-31 ,  People v. Mcintosh (Dutchess 
County Court) (No. 1996/4530) [hereinafter Tendy Summation]. 
256. Id. at 36. 
257. Id. at 39. 
258. Id. at 41-42. 
259. Id. at 52. 
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aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.260 
After fairly short deliberations,261 the jury returned with a life 
sentence.262 
IV. THE ST AND ARDS FOR Ev ALUA TING STRATEGIC CHOICES BY 
ATTORNEYS REPRESENTING CAPITAL DEFENDANTS WITH A STRONG 
CLAIM OF INNOCENCE 
In this Part, I will address the three issues left unresolved by 
Wiggins. Drawing from the material presented in Parts II and III, I 
will seek to articulate axioms that govern the strategic choices of 
experienced capital-defense attorneys when they are representing 
capital defendants with strong claims of innocence. Based not only on 
the material presented in these Parts but also on the ABA Guidelines, 
lower court cases, and, to some extent, the implications of Wiggins 
itself, I will contend that these axioms should also define the standard 
of care that must be met by an attorney who is representing a capital 
defendant with a strong claim of innocence. 
A. The Attorney's Obligation to Investigate for Reasonably A vailable 
Mitigating Evidence 
In Wiggins, the Court placed its imprimatur on a provision of the 
A BA Guidelines declaring that an attorney representing a capital 
defendant has an obligation to investigate for "all reasonably available 
mitigating evidence." In Wiggins, of course, it was obvious that the 
mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's social history was 
"reasonably available" - not only in that it could be obtained but also 
in that it could be obtained without placing an additional strain on the 
other resources available to the defense for investigation.263 In other 
situations, however, attorneys representing capital defendants with 
strong claims of innocence may confront difficult choices relating to 
resource allocation. 
An attorney who believes the defense needs substantial resources 
to support the defendant's claim of innocence, may also know from 
experience that the judge who allocates resources for defense 
investigation will not allocate sufficient resources to allow both what 
the attorney considers necessary to prepare for the guilt trial and what 
seems necessary to obtain the kind of in-depth social history of the 
defendant that would produce powerful mitigating evidence. If the 
260. Stetler Interview, supra note 137. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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judge has already granted the attorney substantial funds for 
investigation that will support the defendant's alibi, for example, the 
attorney may believe that the judge will not allocate funds for the 
mental retardation expert that the defense attorney believes is 
necessary to provide a meaningful analysis of the mitigating evidence 
relating to the defendant's possible mental retardation. Or the 
attorney may know that, given the resources already allocated to the 
defense, the judge will sharply limit the hourly rate to be paid to a 
mental-health expert, thus rendering it impossible for the defense to 
obtain the kind of mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's 
mental impairment that a more skilled mental-health expert would be 
able to provide. In these situations, what is the extent of the attorney's 
obligation to investigate for "all reasonably available mitigating 
evidence?" 
When the resources available for a capital defendant's defense are 
limited, the defendant's attorney must make difficult decisions relating 
to resource allocation. The defense attorney's obligation to investigate 
available mitigating evidence does not mean that she must curtail the 
investigation relating to the guilt trial in order to fulfill this obligation. 
The attorney may reasonably decide to obtain funds for a forensics 
expert who she believes will enhance the defendant's chances at the 
guilt stage, for example, even if she knows that once the judge has 
authorized this expenditure, she will be unlikely to grant funds to 
conduct an adequate investigation of the defendant's possible mental 
impairment. 
But even if the attorney's choices result in her not having the 
resources necessary to conduct a full investigation of potentially 
available mitigating evidence, she should make a record showing that 
she has sought such an investigation.264 At a minimum, she should ask 
the court to appoint a social worker (or other mitigation expert) who 
can conduct a full investigation of the defendant's social history. 
Depending on the circumstances, she should also request funds that 
will allow an adequate investigation of the other areas that, as Wiggins 
noted, the ABA Guidelines have identified as providing sources for 
mitigating evidence.265 These include the defendant's "medical history, 
educational history, employment and training history, . . .  prior adult 
and juvenile correctional experience, and religious and cultural 
influences."266 In some cases, for example, the attorney might be able 
to show the need for a mental-health expert to conduct a meaningful 
264. If the attorney believes allocating resources for the purpose of strengthening the 
defendant's case at the guilt trial must be the defense's first priority, she will generally be 
able to make that priority clear through presenting motions relating to these issues before 
making motions designed to obtain a full investigation for mitigation. 
265. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524. 
266. Id. (citing 1989 GUIDELINES, supra note 55, Guideline 1 1.8.6). 
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investigation of the defendant's medical background or an expert in a 
specific culture to investigate the effect of religious or cultural 
influences on his conduct.267 
Through requesting these resources, the defense attorney would 
make a record of the types of investigation she believed necessary to 
present the "available" mitigating evidence. The attorney's request, 
moreover, would alert the judge as to the extent and nature of 
potentially mitigating evidence. If the judge denied some or all of the 
attorney's request and the defendant subsequently received a death 
sentence, the defense would be able to raise on appeal the question of 
whether the capital defendant was provided with adequate resources 
to present the available mitigating evidence at the penalty trial. In 
some cases, the attorney would have a strong argument that, based on 
Ake v. Oklahoma,268 the court's failure to provide adequate 
compensation for the experts needed to assist the defense in obtaining 
"any reasonably available mitigating evidence" violated the 
defendant's right to due process.269 In all cases the attorney would 
have fulfilled her obligation to seek such evidence. The scope of the 
system's obligation to provide adequate resources for the necessary 
investigation would be a question to be decided by the reviewing 
courts.21° 
B. The A ttorney's Obligation to Investigate for Mitigating Evidence 
When the Defendant Instructs Her Otherwise 
The ABA Guidelines speak directly to the situation in which the 
capital defendant instructs his attorney not to present mitigating 
evidence at the penalty trial. In a sentence that appears immediately 
before the portion of the Guidelines relied on in Wiggins, the 1989 
Guidelines provide, "The investigation for preparation of the 
sentencing phase should be conducted regardless of any initial 
267. See, e.g. , Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (holding 
counsel ineffective due to failure to conduct investigation that would have produced, inter 
alia, expert testimony about the difficulty of adolescent immigrants from Hong Kong 
assimilating to life in North America; this evidence would have humanized the defendant 
and could have resulted in a life sentence, even though the defendant had been convicted of 
thirteen murders). 
268. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
269. See supra notes 107-108. 
270. Wiggins appears to recognize that introducing "any available mitigating evidence" 
will be a critical factor for the defense in many, if not most, capital cases. Whether Ake 
requires compensation for the expert requested by the defense should thus depend on 
whether the defense can make a sufficient showing that the expert is necessary to assist in 
obtaining or evaluating such evidence. But cf The Supreme Court, 2002 Term - Leading 
Cases, 117  HARV. L. REV. 226, 284-85 (2003) (arguing that though Wiggins implies 
mitigation specialists "are not far outside the constitutional fold," courts have been reluctant 
to hold Ake requires them "at nearly every turn"). 
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assertion by the client that mitigation is not to be offered."271 At least 
as to a capital-defense attorney's obligation to investigate mitigating 
evidence, the Wiggins majority appeared to accept the ABA 
Guidelines as establishing "norms" for competent representation by 
capital defendants' attorneys. Unless there is some basis for rejecting 
the ABA Guidelines' statement that a capital-defense counsel has an 
obligation to investigate despite her client's initial instructions to the 
contrary, this portion of the Guidelines should also be viewed as 
establishing the standard for competent performance in capital cases. 
The strongest argument for rejecting this provision of the ABA 
Guidelines is that it needlessly interferes with a capital defendant's 
autonomy. As I have indicated,272 a capital defendant has the right to 
make a binding decision as to what, if any, mitigating evidence will be 
introduced at the penalty trial. Since the attorney must respect her 
client's choice to have no mitigating evidence introduced at the 
penalty trial, a reasonable argument exists that it would be competent 
representation for her to comply with the client's direction not to 
investigate mitigating evidence. After all, there will be no need to 
investigate mitigating evidence if it has already been decided that 
mitigating evidence will not be introduced at the penalty trial.273 
The ABA Guidelines seem to be predicated on the view that, 
unless the attorney conducts a full investigation of potential mitigating 
evidence prior to trial, the defendant will not be able to make an 
informed decision as to the sentencing strategy to be pursued at the 
penalty trial.274 Lower courts addressing the attorney's constitutional 
obligation to investigate mitigating evidence despite the defendant's 
contrary instructions have focused on this issue. 
271. 1989 GUIDELINES, supra note 55, Guideline 11 .4.l(c). In February 2003, the 
American Bar Association updated these Guidelines to read "The investigation regarding 
penalty should be conducted regardless of any statement by the client that evidence bearing 
upon penalty is not to be collected or presented." 2003 GUIDELINES, supra note 161, 
Guideline 10.7.A.2. 
272. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
273. As Michael Burt observed, however, investigation for evidence relating to the 
defendant's social history will often reveal evidence that will strengthen the defendant's case 
at the guilt trial. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. Moreover, since defense counsel 
cannot predict in advance what this investigation will produce, she will generally not be able 
to assess the likelihood that it will yield such evidence. In most cases, the defense attorney 
should thus be required to insist on at least some investigation for mitigating evidence in 
order to prepare for the guilt trial in the capital case. 
274. According to the 1989 Guidelines, an attorney must first investigate and "evaluate 
the potential avenues of action and then advise the client on the merits of each." 1989 
GUIDELINES supra note 55, Guideline 11 .4.1 cmt. The most recent version of the Guidelines 
states that "[ c ]ounsel cannot reasonably advise a client about the merits of different courses 
of action, the client cannot make informed decisions, and counsel cannot be sure of the 
client's competency to make such decisions, unless counsel has first conducted a thorough 
investigation." 2003 GUIDELINES, supra note 161, Guideline 10.7 cmt. 
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Citing the ABA Guidelines' language, the Sixth Circuit has held 
that a full investigation of mitigating evidence "should be conducted 
regardless of any initial assertion by the client that mitigation is not to 
be offered."275 Without citing the Guidelines, the Tenth Circuit 
reached a similar result in a case in which a capital defendant's 
attorney justified his failure to investigate for mitigating evidence by 
asserting he was complying with his client's instructions.276 The Sixth 
Circuit concluded that, unless the attorney investigated for mitigating 
evidence, the defendant would have no "understanding of competing 
mitigating strategies,"277 and thus would be unable to make an 
informed decision as to the proper sentencing strategy. Similarly, the 
Tenth Circuit concluded that the defendant would be unable to make 
an informed choice because the attorney's "failure to investigate 
clearly affected his ability to competently advise [his client] regarding 
the meaning of mitigation evidence and the availability of possible 
mitigating strategies. "278 
Other cases have held, however, that an attorney may comply with 
her client's directions to abandon investigation of mitigating evidence 
so long as the attorney adequately advises the defendant regarding the 
consequences of not investigating.279 The Ninth Circuit, for example, 
has held that "a lawyer who abandons investigation into mitigating 
evidence in a capital case . . .  must at least have adequately informed 
his client of the potential consequences of that decision and must be 
assured that his client has made [an] 'informed and knowing' 
judgment. "280 When the attorney apprises the defendant "of the 
275. Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 450 (6th Cir. 2001); Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 
596 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting 1989 GUIDELINES, supra note 55, Guideline 11 .4.l(c)). 
276. See Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1229 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding defense 
attorney's failure to investigate for mitigating evidence in compliance with his client's 
instructions was ineffective assistance because it "affected his ability to competently advise 
Battenfield regarding the meaning of mitigation evidence and the availability of possible 
mitigation strategies") .  
277. Coleman, 268 F.3d at  447. 
278. Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 1229. 
279. See, e.g. , Williams v. Calderon, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1050 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding 
that a capital defendant's attorney's failure to investigate for mitigating evidence was 
reasonable when the defendant informed him that no evidence should be presented at the 
penalty trial and that, before accepting these instructions, the attorney "discussed the 
purpose of mitigation evidence with [the defendant] and discussed what evidence could have 
been presented"), affd, 306 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2001); Zagorski v. State, 983 S.W.2d 654, 656 
(Tenn. 1998) (holding that a capital defendant's attorney's failure to investigate for 
mitigating evidence was reasonable when the attorney followed the defendant's instructions 
to neither investigate nor present mitigating evidence and the defendant remained firm in 
his instructions even after the attorney informed him "about the importance of and the need 
to investigate" for mitigating evidence); see also cases cited infra note 280. 
280. Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 838 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 942 
(2002); see also Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the Silva 
holding). 
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importance of presenting mitigating evidence,"281 the court has 
determined that the attorney acted reasonably in following the 
defendant's decision not to investigate.282 
But it is not clear that every capital defendant will be able to make 
an informed decision relating to the investigation for mitigating 
evidence even after the attorney fully explains the potential 
significance of mitigating evidence? It might depend on the reasons 
for the defendant's original instructions. A defendant who believes 
locating mitigating evidence is unnecessary because he won't be 
convicted of the capital offense obviously presents a different problem 
than one who prefers a sentence of death over one of life 
imprisonment. Arguably, the latter defendant is in a better position to 
make an informed choice relating to sentencing strategy.283 
Regardless of the defendant's reasons, however, the defendant will 
generally be unable to make an informed decision with respect to 
whether mitigating evidence should be presented at the penalty trial 
until after the attorney has conducted a full investigation. If a 
defendant justifies his instructions on the view that the mitigating 
evidence will be unhelpful in the guilt trial and will be unnecessary in 
the penalty trial because he will achieve an acquittal, the attorney 
should have ready responses. First, in the absence of data gleaned 
from an investigation, nobody - including the defendant - can know 
whether the investigation will produce helpful evidence. Second, the 
outcomes in capital trials are always unpredictable. And if the 
defendant argues that, even if the penalty phase proves necessary, the 
investigation will produce nothing of value, the attorney should 
reiterate that, absent the fruits of the investigation, the defendant 
lacks the information necessary to determine whether it will produce 
sufficient evidence to lead the penalty jury to spare his life. 
Determining the scope of the attorney's obligation to investigate is 
more difficult when the defendant purports to prefer execution over 
life imprisonment or to prefer execution over subjecting his family and 
friends to the aggravation of supplying mitigating evidence. If a 
competent capital defendant makes an informed decision to seek 
execution rather than life imprisonment at the penalty trial, the 
defense attorney is required to respect that decision.284 If the 
281. Hayes, 301 F.3d at 1068. 
282. Id. 
283. Even if a seemingly competent defendant expresses this preference, his attorney 
must be alert to the possibility that the defendant may change his mind and that his choice is 
made "without a full appreciation of the consequences." Bright email, supra note 107. 
284. See, e.g. , Zagorski v. State, 983 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn. 1998) . It should follow, 
moreover, that the attorney should also be required to respect a defendant's informed 
decision to opt for execution rather seeking a life sentence under circumstances that he 
views as imposing intolerable burdens for either himself or his loved ones. 
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defendant's decision to opt for execution in the event of conviction 
should be viewed as an informed decision as to the objective to be 
pursued at the penalty trial, the attorney should thus be required to 
respect that decision. 
A defense attorney should not assume, however, that a capital 
defendant's pretrial decision to opt for a death sentence at the penalty 
trial, in the event it occurs, is a fully informed decision. When 
confronted with a capital trial, a defendant, especially one who claims 
he is innocent, will be much more likely to be focused on the guilt trial 
at which he may be acquitted than on a penalty trial, which will take 
place only if he is convicted of a capital offense. In most cases, it is 
thus reasonable to assume that the defendant will not be able to make 
an informed decision as to the objective to be pursued at the penalty 
trial until the jury's verdict at the guilt trial forces him to confront the 
reality of that trial. 
In order to ensure that a capital defendant can make a fully 
informed decision as to whether to seek a sentence of life 
imprisonment or death at the penalty trial, the defendant's attorney 
should thus provide the defendant with the opportunity to make his 
final decision only after the verdict at the guilt stage forces the 
defendant to focus on the stark, available sentencing alternatives. In 
order to provide the defendant with a meaningful opportunity to make 
a decision at this stage, however, the attorney would ordinarily have 
had to conduct a full investigation for available mitigating evidence 
prior to the guilt stage. Otherwise, if the defendant's final decision is 
that he wants to seek a life sentence at the penalty trial, the attorney 
will not ordinarily have sufficient time to find the mitigating evidence 
that she would need to introduce in order to maximize the chances of 
obtaining that objective. 
Accordingly, if a capital defendant instructs his attorney prior to 
trial either not to investigate or to curtail investigation for mitigating 
evidence, the attorney should nevertheless have an obligation to 
investigate for all reasonably available mitigating evidence. Failure to 
comply with this obligation, moreover, should constitute deficient 
performance within the meaning of the first prong of the Strickland 
test. 
C. The Attorney's Obligation to Make a Reasonable Strategic 
Decision Relating to Potential Mitigating Evidence 
Wiggins's analysis indicates that a defense attorney's strategic 
decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence because she 
wants to focus primarily or exclusively on reasserting the capital 
defendant's innocence at the penalty trial must be subjected to 
constitutional scrutiny. Justice O'Connor recognized that, prior to 
conducting a full investigation for mitigating evidence, an attorney 
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may not reasonably conclude that introducing such evidence would be 
unnecessary or counter-productive simply because the argument based 
on the defendant's innocence is so strong. Rather, her opinion 
recognized that, when the potential mitigating evidence is persuasive 
and not double-edged, combining the mitigating evidence with 
evidence or argument relating to the defendant's innocence will likely 
be a more effective sentencing strategy than relying solely on 
reasserting the defendant's innocence.285 
Through its citation to earlier cases,286 Wiggins indicates that a 
capital defendant's attorney's decision to curtail investigation will be a 
reasonable strategic choice if the attorney's preliminary investigation 
justifies a conclusion that introducing the potentially available 
mitigating evidence would be unhelpful or counter-productive. Under 
what circumstances can an attorney representing a capital defendant 
with a strong claim of innocence reasonably reach this conclusion? 
More specifically, when may such an attorney reasonably conclude 
that the investigation for mitigating evidence can be abandoned 
because the evidence likely to be found will be double-edged in the 
sense that it may convince the jury either that the defendant's guilt for 
the offense of which he was convicted is more certain or his potential 
danger to society is increased? 
Based on Wiggins itself, a capital defendant's attorney cannot 
reasonably conclude that introducing mitigating evidence relating to a 
defendant's troubled childhood or severe mental problems would be 
so double-edged that the attorney can curtail investigation for such 
evidence. In discussing the Wiggins attorneys' sentencing strategy, 
Justice O'Connor emphasized that the mitigating evidence available in 
Wiggins did not show that Wiggins had previously engaged in violent 
conduct.287 She thus concluded that the evidence "contained little of 
the double edge"288 and intimated that introducing it at the penalty 
trial would have been compatible with the strategy of reasserting the 
defendant's innocence. 
Although Wiggins thus suggests that a capital defendant's attorney 
could make a reasonable strategic decision to curtail investigation for 
mitigating evidence when the preliminary investigation reveals that 
the defendant had engaged in prior violent conduct,289 the ABA 
285. See supra notes 1 18-120 and accompanying text. 
286. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), 
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986), and Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987)). 
287. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 536. 
288. Id. at 535. 
289. In addition to explaining that the mitigating evidence in Wiggins did not show prior 
violent conduct, the Court also distinguished its holding in Darden v. Wainwright. In Darden, 
the Court held that counsel can reasonably curtail investigation when "the decision to 
present a mitigation case would . . .  result[] in the jury hearing evidence that [the defendant] 
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Guidelines do not provide that the attorney should abandon the 
investigation for any such reason.290 And the material presented in 
Parts II and III of this Article indicate that experienced capital­
defense attorneys would certainly not curtail the investigation into a 
defendant's background because of concerns that tracing his social 
history would reveal that he engaged in violent or other anti-social 
conduct. 
In the Mcintosh case, for example, the defendant's attorney 
certainly had reason to believe that, based on the defendant's 
prolonged exposure to violence during his childhood, investigation of 
his background might reveal that he had engaged in violent behavior 
as an adult. In fact, the investigation of mitigation evidence showed 
that the defendant had engaged in such conduct and had at least one 
assault-and-battery conviction.291 Mcintosh's attorneys, however, 
chose to present that mitigating evidence despite the possibility that 
the jury would view Mcintosh as a more violent person. Introducing 
evidence that would provide the jury with a full picture of the 
defendant's troubled history was an indispensable aspect of their 
sentencing strategy. 
In fact, skilled capital-defense attorneys agree that, regardless of 
whether the defendant has a strong claim of innocence at the guilt 
trial, the defense attorney must present mitigating evidence relating to 
the defendant's background at the penalty trial. If the defendant's 
background includes prior violent conduct, obviously the attorney 
does not want to emphasize this (or allow the prosecutor to emphasize 
it) at the penalty trial. Nevertheless, an experienced capital-defense 
attorney would be very unlikely to curtail an investigation for 
mitigating evidence simply because she believes it would be likely to 
uncover evidence showing the defendant has engaged in prior violent 
conduct. 
The investigation should be conducted because it may reveal other 
mitigating evidence that can be introduced without exposing the jury 
to the defendant's prior violent conduct.292 Moreover, even if no such 
had been convicted of violent crimes and spent much of his life in jail." Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 
525 (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986)). However, Wiggins's attorneys 
"uncovered (nothing) in their investigation to suggest that a mitigation case, in its own right, 
would have been counterproductive, or that further investigation would have been fruitless." 
Id. 
290. The A BA Guidelines state that "[u]nless a plea bargain has resulted in a guarantee 
on the record that the death penalty will not be imposed, full preparation for a sentencing 
trial must be made in every case." 1989 GUIDELINES, supra note 55, Guidelines 11 .8.1-11 .8.6 
cmt (second emphasis added). 
291. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
292. In some cases, for example, the defendant's attorney would be able to introduce 
mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's troubled childhood without opening the door 
for the introduction of violent acts committed by the defendant when he was an adult. 
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evidence is discovered, an experienced capital-defense attorney will 
nearly always opt to introduce mitigating evidence that provides the 
jury with an opportunity to "walk in the defendant's footsteps,"293 
regardless of whether it also exposes them to the defendant's prior 
violent or antisocial conduct.294 As Stephen Bright said, if the attorney 
does not "humanize" the defendant by presenting a nuanced narrative 
of his past, the penalty jury will be likely to feel that it has no reason to 
spare the defendant's life.295 
While Wiggins did not hold that a defense attorney representing a 
capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence can never make a 
reasonable strategic decision to curtail investigation for mitigating 
evidence, it indicated that the professional norms for capital-defense 
attorneys are expressed in the ABA Guidelines, which in turn reflect 
the practices of skilled and experienced capital-defense attorneys. 
Based on these norms, an attorney representing a capital defendant 
with a strong claim of innocence should almost never be able to make 
a reasonable strategic decision to curtail investigation for mitigating 
evidence. Such a decision should nearly always constitute deficient 
performance under the first prong of the Strickland test. 
CONCLUSION 
Even those who favor the death penalty believe that our system of 
capital punishment should operate so that the risk of executing an 
innocent person is minimized.296 Data showing that innocent 
defendants have frequently been convicted and sentenced to death 
have therefore provoked increasing public concem.297 When so many 
innocent defendants have been and undoubtedly still are on death 
row,298 it is almost inevitable that some will not be exonerated in time 
to avoid execution. As Justice O'Connor stated in a speech given in 
293. See supra notes 257-258 and accompanying text. 
294. Michael Burt stated that he would not be concerned about introducing background 
evidence that would expose the jury to the defendant's prior violent conduct unless it 
"opened up the possibility of the prosecutor admitting aggravating circumstances, that would 
be commensurate with the crime charged." Burt Interview, supra note 132. Thus, the 
defense should be concerned if admitting mitigating evidence would allow the prosecution to 
show the defendant had previously been involved in a murder or an attempted murder but 
should not be concerned if the prosecutor could only be able to show that the defendant had 
previously been involved in burglaries, assaults, or other charges significantly less serious 
than the capital charge. 
295. See supra text accompanying note 157. 
296. See Welsh, supra note 149, at 981-82. 
297. See, e.g. , infra note 299. 
298. As of August 29, 2002, 12 of the 1 10 DNA-cleared cases were cases in which the 
exonerated defendant was at one point sentenced to death. See http//innocenceproject.org/ 
case/index.php (last visited Mar. 20, 2003). 
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2001, "If statistics are any indication, the system may well be allowing 
some innocent defendants to be executed."299 
Unfortunately, the strategies employed by some attorneys who 
represent capital defendants with strong claims of innocence may 
exacerbate the extent to which innocent defendants are sentenced to 
death. An attorney representing a capital defendant with a strong 
claim of innocence who focuses primarily or exclusively on seeking to 
obtain an acquittal at the guilt trial will inevitably find it difficult to 
present an optimal penalty-phase defense and, as a result, will increase 
the likelihood that the jury will sentence the defendant to death in the 
event that they find him guilty of the capital offense. Although a jury's 
lingering doubt as to the defendant's guilt can be a strong factor in 
producing a life sentence, defense attorneys are inclined to 
overestimate the likelihood that the death-qualified jury that 
convicted the defendant will in fact have a lingering doubt as to his 
guilt. If the jury has no lingering doubt about the defendant's guilt and 
the defense attorney introduces little or no mitigating evidence at the 
penalty trial, the penalty jury will be likely to conclude that there is no 
reason to spare the defendant's life. As a result, death penalties are 
likely to be disproportionately imposed in cases in which the 
defendants' attorneys believe the defendants have strong claims of 
innocence - a pool of cases that includes many, if not most of those in 
which the defendants are actually innocent.300 
With respect to monitoring defense attorneys' representation of 
capital defendants, the Court's decision in Wiggins is certainly a 
positive development. Although Wiggins's holding could be confined 
to the specific ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim presented in that 
case, the Court's analysis may have been animated, at least in part, by 
its recognition of concerns relating to the administration of capital 
punishment, including not only attorneys' inadequate representation 
of capital defendants but also the risk of executing an innocent 
defendant. If so, then the fact that Wiggins involved a defendant with 
a strong claim of innocence may have been significant. The Court's 
holding could provide at least a first step toward decreasing the 
likelihood that defendants with strong claims of innocence will be 
299. Marla Elena Baca, O'Connor Critical of Death Penalty: The First Female Supreme 
Court Justice Spoke in Minneapolis to a Lawyer's Group, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), 
July 3, 2001, at Al ,  Al6. 
300. In some cases involving defendants who are actually innocent, the evidence 
presented at trial may appear to establish the defendant's guilt beyond any reasonable 
doubt. This may occur, for example, when the government introduces the defendant's false 
confession into evidence and the defendant's attorney fails to present any persuasive reasons 
for disbelieving the confession. For a description of one such case, see Eric M. Freedman, 
Earl Washington 's Ordeal, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1089 (2001) (describing the case of Earl 
Washington, Jr., a mentally retarded defendant who was convicted and sentenced to death 
on the basis of his false confession to the rape and murder of a young woman). 
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sentenced to death, thereby reducing the risk that an innocent person 
will be executed. 
As I explained in Part II, Wiggins's holding could be limited in at 
least three ways. First, an attorney's obligation to investigate for 
available mitigating evidence could be defined so as to include only 
the obligation to investigate for mitigating evidence that can be 
obtained without placing a strain on existing resources. Second, an 
attorney's obligation to investigate for mitigating evidence could be 
limited to situations in which the attorney does not receive contrary 
instructions from the defendant. Third, an attorney could be afforded 
the right to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence on the basis of 
a strategic decision when she perceives that the evidence likely to be 
revealed will be double-edged in the sense that it is likely to conflict 
with her claim that the defendant was innocent of the capital offense. 
If Wiggins is to be interpreted in a way that will significantly 
diminish the risk of sentencing innocent capital defendants to death, 
none of these limitations should apply. As to the attorney's duty to 
investigate for mitigating evidence, the ABA Guidelines, recognized 
by Wiggins as articulating professional norms for capital-defense 
attorneys, are clearly premised on the view that a defense attorney 
must investigate for any reasonably available mitigating evidence in 
every capital case. Even if she knows that the court will limit the 
resources for defense investigation and believes that investigation 
relating to the defense at the guilt trial is more important than 
investigation for mitigating evidence, the attorney should file a motion 
with the court requesting the appointment of an investigator who can 
trace the defendant's background and social history. And, whenever 
other investigators or experts appear necessary to seek and to render 
meaningful the available mitigating evidence, the attorney should 
request further funds.301 
In accordance with the ABA Guidelines, a capital defendant's 
attorney's obligation to investigate for all reasonably available 
mitigating evidence should also apply regardless of the defendant's 
contrary instructions. Interpreting the attorney's obligation in this way 
will ensure that a capital defendant will be able to make an informed 
decision as to the sentencing strategy to be adopted at the penalty 
trial, if it occurs. Protecting a capital defendant's right to make an 
informed choice as to this question is especially important, moreover, 
when the defendant has a strong claim of innocence because, prior to 
the guilt trial at which he hopes to be acquitted, such a defendant may 
be unable to focus on the consequences of adopting a particular 
301. In some cases, the motion would make it clear that the evidence found by the first 
investigator will determine whether other experts need to be appointed. 
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sentencing strategy at a penalty trial, which will only occur if his hopes 
for acquittal are disappointed. 
Finally, while Wiggins indicated that a capital defendant can make 
a reasonable strategic decision to curtail investigation for mitigating 
evidence, the Court also appeared to recognize that the standard 
against which such strategic choices must be measured should be one 
that reflects the practices of skilled and experienced capital-defense 
attorneys. Based on the practices of these attorneys, the following rule 
should be adopted: an attorney representing a capital defendant with a 
strong claim of innocence can never make a reasonable strategic 
decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence simply because 
she wants to emphasize the defendant's innocence at the penalty trial. 
Even if the potentially available mitigating evidence appears likely to 
be double-edged, the attorney representing such a defendant should 
conduct a full investigation and, barring very unusual circumstances, 
should introduce at least some of the mitigating evidence at the 
penalty trial, if it occurs. 
In Wiggins, the Court appeared to recognize that by 1989 the 
norms of practice for capital-defense attorneys had evolved to the 
point where the attorney ordinarily has the obligation to investigate 
for "all reasonably available mitigating evidence." Through following 
the provisions of the ABA Guidelines relating to searching for 
mitigating evidence, capital-defense attorneys can reduce the 
likelihood that innocent capital defendants will be sentenced to death. 
And through applying Wiggins's holding in ways that reflect the 
underlying rationale of these guidelines, courts can take a meaningful 
step toward monitoring attorneys' performance in a way that will 
reduce the risk of an innocent defendant's execution. 
